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DRAFT 
 
FROM HIERARCHIES TO MARKETS: FEDEX DRIVERS AND THE WORK 
CONTRACT AS INSTITUTIONAL MARKER  
Julia Tomassetti* 
Judges are often called upon today to determine whether certain 
workers are “employees” or “independent contractors.” The dis-
tinction is important, because only employees have rights under 
most statutes regulating work, including wage and hour and anti-
discrimination law. Too often judges exclude workers from statuto-
ry protection who resemble what scholars have described as “typi-
cal” employees—long-term, full-time workers with set wages and 
routinized responsibilities within a large firm. To explain how 
courts reach these counterintuitive results, the article examines 
recent decisions finding that FedEx delivery drivers are independ-
ent contractors rather than employees. The article finds that insta-
bility in the legal distinction between employees and independent 
contractors is embedded within the employment contract itself, in 
the law’s attempt to construe the legal relations of master and 
servant as a “contract.” By merging contractual formation and 
performance, this attempt creates two doctrinal ambiguities. By 
manipulating these ambiguities, the courts transformed some of the 
same vulnerabilities that place the drivers within the policy con-
cerns of collective bargaining and wage and hour law into evi-
dence of their autonomy. The courts also attempted to reconcile 
the awkward fit of master-servant authority and contract by con-
structing the written contract that drivers sign as an institutional 
marker of non-employment. 
 
The attempt to encase master-servant authority in contract also 
destabilizes distinctions between firms and markets. The FedEx 
decisions marshal this instability to redefine a firm, as conceptual-
ized by major economic theories of the firm, as a market. They 
conflate the de-personality of bureaucracy with the impersonality 
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of the market. The drivers’ fungibility as low-skilled workers per-
forming standardized routines becomes evidence of their entrepre-
neurial opportunity, and the decisions submerged the FedEx bu-
reaucracy beneath a nexus of contracts. The decisions reject theo-
ries of the firm that ground the legitimacy of the corporation in the 
production of goods and services. While we ultimately require a 
more radical transformation in work relations to prevent decision 
makers from redefining servitude as equality, the article recom-
mends two provisional suggestions to improve decision-making in 
disputes over employment status.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Most times when we receive a package delivery, whether it’s 
from UPS, FedEx, or the Postal Service, it looks like the drivers 
are pretty much doing the same work. We track the package online 
or receive email updates regarding the delivery date. The doorbell 
rings. Outside is a deliveryman, neatly groomed, in uniform, and 
sporting an ID badge and the company logo. He is courteous as he 
hands you the package and perhaps requests your signature. As he 
turns to return to a recognizable truck, he says, “Have a nice day.”  
 You might find it difficult to believe that, according to FedEx, 
its drivers are not employees, but independent contractors—even 
entrepreneurs. You might also find it difficult to believe that the 
employment status of FedEx drivers is a contested legal issue, and 
has been for decades. 
 The distinction between employees and independent contrac-
tors is important, because only employees have rights under most 
statutes regulating work, including wage and hour, anti-
discrimination, and collective bargaining law. Only employers 
have obligations under these laws, such as paying unemployment 
insurance premiums or payroll taxes.1   
 FedEx classifies about 16,000 package and delivery drivers 
nationwide as independent contractors. Other drivers it classifies as 
                                                     
1 See Noah Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in THE 
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA’S LABOR 
MARKET (Annette D Bernhardt, et al. eds., 2008); KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM 
WIDGETS TO DIGITS (2004). 
8/12/2015] From Hierarchies to Markets 3 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
employees of its independent contractors and not of FedEx.2 By 
relying on these classifications, FedEx has frustrated drivers’ at-
tempts to unionize under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA) and to obtain relief under other law, including workers 
compensation and wage and hour legislation. While the work of 
UPS and FedEx drivers is nearly identical, the positions differ. 
UPS drivers are unionized. They earn about $60,000 per year and 
have health insurance and other benefits. FedEx drivers earn about 
$25,000-$35,000 per year and have sparse benefits apart from an-
nual vacation.3  
 Today, countless employers are re-organizing work to avoid 
the legal duties of an employment relationship. Many are re-
categorizing employees as independent contractors. Many are re-
nouncing their legal identity as the “employer” of workers they 
control through subcontractors, subsidiaries, or other intermediar-
ies.4 Disputes over employment status affect millions of workers 
and arise across a wide spectrum of work—from manufacturing to 
services, low skill to professional work, and the public to private 
sector.5 The re-organization of work costs state and federal treasur-
                                                     
2 FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB (FHD), 563 F.3d 492, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (4,000 
FedEx Home division drivers); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., No. 3:05-MD-527 
RM, 2007 WL 3036891, at *2 (Oct. 12 2007) (12,000 FedEx Ground division drivers). 
3 STEVEN GREENHOUSE, THE BIG SQUEEZE: TOUGH TIMES FOR THE AMERICAN 
WORKER 123 (2008). New York FedEx drivers earn about $750 per week, for sixty-hour 
weeks and sparse benefits; UPS drivers earn about $1,400 per week and receive benefits. 
Josh Kosman, Trucking Crazy! FedEx Guts Bill That Would Have Aided Drivers, N.Y. 
POST, Aug. 8, 2013, at 22, available at http://nypost.com/2013/08/10/trucking-crazy-
fedex-guts-bill-that-would-have-aided-drivers.  
4 See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014); Zatz, supra note _; 
CATHERINE RUCKELSHUAS, REBECCA SMITH, SARAH LEBERSTEIN, & EUNICE CHO, NAT’L 
EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, WHO’S THE BOSS (2014) [hereinafter WHO’S THE BOSS?]; 
LALITH DESILVA, ADRIAN MILLETT, DOMINIC ROTONDI, & WILLIAM SULLIVAN, 
PLANMATICS, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS (2000) [hereinafter PLANMATICS] (one of few 
studies with robust national data on extent of contingent employment). See also 
CATHERINE K. RUCKELSHAUS, NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, LEVELING THE 
PLAYING FIELD: PROTECTING WORKERS AND BUSINESSES AFFECTED BY 
MISCLASSIFICATION (2010) (employers can save over 30% on payroll costs by avoiding 
taxes through worker misclassification). For some purposes, firms prefer to classify 
workers as employees. Under the Copyright Act, only independent contractors by default 
have intellectual property rights in their creative works. See Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989). Also, workers compensation insurance 
does not cover injuries to independent contractors, putting firms at risk of tort liability. 
See, e.g., Carr v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., 733 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012). 
5 See, e.g., DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).  
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ies billions in tax revenue. It costs workers billions in wage theft 
and is a means by which firms drive down industry wages.6 The 
questions “who is an employee”?” and “who is an employer” have 
assumed global significance, particularly in places that tie social 
insurance and civil rights to employment.7 
 FedEx has litigated its drivers’ employment status since the 
late 1980s.8 Several dozen lawsuits are pending today, including 
class actions from over thirty states.9 FedEx expends substantial 
resources litigating drivers’ employment status, because the viabil-
ity of its business model depends on avoiding the work law obliga-
tions faced by its main competitor, the unionized UPS.10 While 
most courts and agencies are finding the drivers to be employees,11 
                                                     
6 WHO’S THE BOSS; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CONTINGENT WORKERS: 
INCOMES AND BENEFITS LAG BEHIND THOSE OF REST OF WORKFORCE (2000). 
   7 See, e.g., RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE STANDARD 
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT (Katherine V. W. Stone and H. W. Arthurs eds., 2013); THE 
IDEA OF LABOUR LAW (Guy Davidov and Brian Langille eds., 2011). 
8 See, e.g., Roadway Package System, 292 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1989). See also Jeffrey 
M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur? 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353 (2011); Micah P. S. 
Jost, Independent Contractors, Employees, and Entrepreneurialism Under the National 
Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker Approach, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 311 
(2011); Jamison F. Grella, From Corporate Express to FedEx Home Delivery: A New 
Hurdle for Employees Seeking the Protections of the National Labor Relations Act in the 
D.C. Circuit, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 877 (2009); Todd D. Saveland, Fed-
Ex’s New Employees: Their Disgruntled Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP. L.J. 95 
(2009). 
9 Anna Kwidzinski, Ninth Cir. Says FedEx Drivers in Two States Are Employees, 
Not Independent Contractors, Aug. 28, 2014, 12 WLR 1443 [BNA]; GREENHOUSE, su-
pra note _, at 123. 
10  Anya Litvak, FedEx Ground Makes Change to Independent Contractor Model, 
PITTSBURGH BUS. TIMES, June 10, 2010, 
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2010/ 06/14/story4.html?page=all; Fed-
Ex’s air-freight division classifies its workers as employees; however, in 1996 the com-
pany successfully lobbied Congress (including by giving many Congresspersons rides in 
its jets) to put its drivers under the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) rather 
than the NLRA, which would require all 40,000 drivers dispersed across the country to 
organize in one national unit, making it very difficult to organize a union. GREENHOUSE, 
supra note _, at 122; Neil A. Lewis, A Lobby Effort That Delivers The Big Votes; Federal 
Express Knows Its Way Around Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1996, available at 1996 
WLNR 4407778. By one estimate, FedEx has saved up to $400 million per year by clas-
sifying its drivers as independent contractors. GREENHOUSE, supra note _. 
11 See, e.g., In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 10–3115, 2015 WL 
4099853 (7th Cir. July 8, 2015); Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 787 
F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006 *9, 17 (E.D. Mo. 2013); 
Schwann v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., No. 11–11094–RGS, 2013 WL 3353776 (D. 
(continued next page) 
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important decisions deeming the drivers to be independent contrac-
tors still stand.12 
 Most statutes and administrative guidelines fail to define em-
ployee or employer in any helpful matter.13 This has left the issue 
of employment status largely in the hands of adjudicators,14 on the 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board, the agency that en-
forces the NLRA. Judges apply common law standards and make 
decisions on a case-by-case basis. The resulting case law is notori-
ously inconsistent as to who is, and who is not, in an employment 
relationship.15 Further, judges have excluded many workers from 
statutory protection who fit squarely within the policy concerns of 
the law.16  
                                                                                                                       
Mass. July 3, 2013), overturned in part, 2015 WL 501512 (2015); Estrada v. FedEx 
Ground, No. BC 210310, 2004 WL 5631425 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004), aff’d, Estra-
da v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Ct. App. 2007); Craig v. FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2014); FedEx Home Delivery, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198 (2014).  
12 FHD, 563 F.3d 492; In re FedEx Ground Package Sys. (Kansas decision), 734 
F.Supp.2d 557 (N.D. Ind. 2010), rev’d, In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 10–
3115 2015 WL 4099853 (7th Cir. July 8, 2015); In re FedEx Ground Package Sys. (Mul-
ti-state decision), 758 F.Supp.2d 638 (N.D. Ind. 2010), rev’d in part, Alexander v. FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014), Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package 
Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014), and Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, 
Inc., 787 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015). 
13 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (defining “employee” for purposes of employee 
benefit 
plans). See also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It 
Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295 
(2001). 
14 Hereafter, “judges” refers to adjudicators on administrative agencies and courts.  
15 See Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employ-
ment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees with Employers, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 260 (2006); Carlson, supra note _, at 298–301, 338. 
16 See, e.g., SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, INDEPENDENT 
CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND 
STATE TREASURIES (2012) (summarizing twenty state-level studies of scope and costs of 
independent contractor misclassification); U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING 
COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION (2009); AMERICAN RIGHTS AT 
WORK, THE HAVES AND THE HAVE-NOTS: HOW AMERICAN LABOR LAW DENIES A 
QUARTER OF THE WORKFORCE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS (2008); EMPLOYMENT 
DEV. DEP'T, STATE OF CAL., ANNUAL REPORT: FRAUD DETERRENCE AND DETECTION 
ACTIVITIES (2008), available at http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/report2008.pdf; JOHN 
PETRO, DRUM MAJOR INSTITUTE, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: HOW THE MISCLASSIFICATION 
OF TRUCK DRIVERS HURTS WORKERS, JOB QUALITY, AND NEW YORK STATE (2012); 
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, JOINT TASK FORCE ON THE UNDERGROUND 
ECONOMY AND EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, ANNUAL REPORT (2010). 
6    
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
 Two federal courts recently upheld FedEx’s labeling of its de-
livery drivers as independent contractors.17 The first was the D.C. 
Circuit, the most powerful appellate court in the United States. In 
2009, in the case of FedEx Home Delivery (FHD) it granted sum-
mary judgment to FedEx, finding that drivers who had voted to 
unionize had no right to do so, because they were not employees.18 
The other is a district court in Indiana, where class actions by Fed-
Ex drivers from over 30 states were consolidated in historic, multi-
district litigation. The drivers were suing FedEx primarily for 
fraud, wage and hour violations, and workers compensation.19 The 
multi-district decisions on the drivers’ employment status have 
been overturned in a few states (by every court that has reviewed 
them thus far),20 but FHD remains intact.21  
 The central question of this paper is, how was it possible for 
courts finding the drivers to be independent contractors to reach 
these counterintuitive results? By examining this question, the pa-
per penetrates broader questions about the legal identity of em-
ployment: what accounts for the well-known inconsistency in the 
case law on employment status? How are judges able to find that 
workers who are clearly within the policy scope of workplace 
regulation are excluded as independent contractors? How do judg-
es transform what scholars have described as “standard” employ-
ment into “independent entrepreneurialism”? The paper does not 
offer a doctrinal solution to the question of employment status. Ra-
ther, it offers a new theory of what allows judges to reach incon-
sistent and policy-defeating results in the first instance.  
                                                     
17 FHD, 563 F.3d 492; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557; Multi-state decision, 
758 F.Supp.2d 638. 
18 FHD, 563 F.3d 492. 
19 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557; Multi-state decision, 758 F.Supp.2d 638. 
 
20 The Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits (the latter following the Kansas Su-
preme Court) reversed Judge Miller’s Kansas decision and Multi-state decision for driv-
ers in their jurisdictions. In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 10–3115, 2015 WL 
4099853 (7th Cir. July 8, 2015); Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 
(9th Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Carlson v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 787 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015); Craig v. 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66 (Kan. 2014). 
21 A broad regime of federal preemption in labor law makes FHD all the more important. 
See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527, 1530-31, 1569-79 (2002) (discussing federal preemption of labor law). 
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 The problem is more deep-seated than others have surmised. 
Other legal scholars tend to attribute inconsistency and statutory 
exclusion in the case law to a decline in industrial work since the 
1970s or to imprecision in the legal tests for employment status. 
Neither of these accounts can explain the FedEx cases: the drivers 
resemble what scholars and judges have referred to as “standard” 
or “industrial” employees—fulltime, long-term workers with set 
wages and pre-defined, routinized duties within a large firm.22 Fur-
ther, many of the features that are evidence of employment status 
under the legal tests are present in the drivers’ relationship. Where 
judges disagree is on their legal meaning. 
 This paper shows that instability in the legal distinction be-
tween employment and non-employment is rooted in the employ-
ment contract itself, in its attempt to construe the legal relations of 
master and servant as a “contract.” The attempt to fit employment 
in the framework of contract creates two doctrinal ambiguities that 
make the dominant standard for distinguishing employment from 
independent contracting relationships—the means-end standard—
irresolvable.  
 The means-ends standard looks to the extent of the alleged em-
ployer’s right to control the work. An employer has a right to con-
trol the “means” of the work, not only the “ends” of the work. The 
major tests for employment status ask judges to consider a long, 
open-ended list of factors to determine whether the alleged em-
ployer controls the means of the work, like the extent of supervi-
sion and whether the alleged employer has a right to assign daily 
work.23  
 The fusion of master-servant authority and contract make the 
means-end question irresolvable by blurring contractual formation 
and performance. Parties to an employment relationship do not 
consummate a contractual bargain through an exchange of promis-
es, or through an exchange of a promise for performance, and later 
move onto the business of carrying out the agreement. Employ-
ment entails a continuing renewal of offer and acceptance through 
an exchange of performances.   
 First, the employment contract makes ambiguous the activities 
of bargaining over the work and carrying out the work, or produc-
                                                     
22 See infra Part I.B. 
23 See infra Part I.A. 
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ing. Employee and employer bargain as they produce goods or ser-
vices: the employer bargains over the terms of work by directing 
the work, and the employee accepts these contractual offers by fol-
lowing the employer’s direction each moment the employee works 
without quitting. The means-ends standard, however, depends on 
being able to distinguish when the parties are bargaining from 
when they are producing. It may look like one party is controlling 
the work, for example, but if the parties are still negotiating, then 
one party may be getting its way by driving a hard bargain, not be-
cause it is an employer. The employment contract in practice 
merges independence in negotiating the “ends” of the work with 
obedience in producing, the “means” of the work.  
 The second ambiguity surfaces in attempts to interpret a writ-
ten work agreement in disputes over employment status, rather 
than in distinguishing the activities of bargaining from producing. 
It is the ambiguity between contractual duties and the manner of 
performing them. The means-ends standard depicts employment as 
a contract, but a special kind of contract—it gives one party a right 
to determine how the other party carries out its contractual obliga-
tions. In other contracts, the parties commit one another only to the 
“ends” of the deal; neither has a right to dictate how the other party 
satisfies these ends. The employment contract, however, gives one 
this right: the employer has a right to control the “means” of the 
work. The means-ends standard depends on being able to distin-
guish between contractual duties and the manner of their perfor-
mance, in order to evaluate whether one party is controlling the 
latter or only the former. The problem is, again, that the fusion of 
master-servant authority with contract makes the distinction illuso-
ry. The employer and employee determine “contractual” duties as 
they produce.  
This conundrum puts a written agreement in an ambiguous po-
sition in employment status disputes. Courts disagree as to what 
extent, if at all, the alleged employer controls its workers when it 
relies on a written contract to direct the work: Does any term ap-
pearing in a written agreement, by virtue of its expression in some-
thing labeled an “agreement” or “contract,” state a contractual end? 
If the alleged employer is not telling workers to do anything not in 
the contract, is it not controlling the work? By contrast, might 
some provisions of the contract describe how contractual ends are 
to be performed?  
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 Using the decisions finding FedEx drivers to be independent 
contractors (the “IC decisions”), this paper shows that the attempt 
to fuse master-servant authority and contract enables courts to 
transform employees into entrepreneurs. The IC decisions mar-
shaled the doctrinal ambiguities embedded within the employment 
contract to redefine nearly all of the factors probative of employ-
ment status under the legal tests as evidence consistent with, if not 
evidence of, independent contracting. They engaged the ambigui-
ties to transform features of the drivers’ work that were typical of 
industrial employment into evidence of entrepreneurial opportuni-
ty. In the IC decisions, delivery route assignments, daily package 
assignments, supervision, discipline, promotions, shift replace-
ments, training, the unskilled nature of the work, job duration, qua-
si-at-will authority, schedule controls, and work rules involving 
driving, appearance, customer interaction, and package handling 
became either irrelevant to the drivers’ employment status or af-
firmative evidence that the drivers were independent businessper-
sons.  
 The FedEx disputes not only reveal the law’s role in destabiliz-
ing the conventional boundaries of work relations, but also in re-
constituting them. As part of the employment contract itself, the 
ambiguities between bargaining and producing, and between con-
tractual duties and their performance, permit no doctrinal resolu-
tion. Stability in the legal identity of contemporary work relations 
depends on how we institutionalize them. 
 To institutionalize something is to construct it as a pattern of 
organizations, activities, norms, roles, and media.24 This pattern is 
historically specific, but tends to be durable and taken-for-granted. 
The elements of this pattern are institutional markers, features that 
signal a relationship is of one particular type and not another. 25  
 The law plays a special role in institutionalization. Judges look 
to what are ostensibly extra-legal data points to impart meaning to 
legal categories, and organizations adjust their practices to mimic 
legal categories. Organizational practice provides the doctrinal cat-
egories with content that makes them recognizable, and meaning-
                                                     
24 See VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005).  
25 See also Noah Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the 
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. R. 857 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Zatz, Working at the Boundaries].  
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ful, as social relations. At the same time, the law confers legitima-
cy on organizational practices when it recognizes them as valid 
legal categories.26  
While the tension within employment between master-servant 
authority and contract has always been there, it surfaces in times of 
institutional disruption. The dominant institutional résumé of em-
ployment in the 20th century, in terms of political and cultural sali-
ence, was industrial employment. Employment was a long-term, 
full-time, direct relationship between a large firm and a worker 
with set wages and pre-defined duties. The institution of industrial 
employment submerged, for a time and in certain places, the con-
tradictory complex of servitude and equality that defines employ-
ment. It did not resolve it. Today, the growing service sector, revo-
lutions in logistics and communications technology, financializa-
tion, and other developments are disrupting the institutional order 
of industrial work. As courts contend with the doctrinal manifesta-
tions of this disruption, they also work to re-institutionalize em-
ployment.  
The IC decisions seek to re-institutionalize what looks much 
like industrial employment—a direct, full-time, long-term relation-
ship between a worker and a large firm—as one of independent 
entrepreneurialism. The paper explores two ways in which the de-
cisions construct the drivers’ written work agreement with FedEx 
as an institutional marker of non-employment.  
As they re-institutionalize contemporary work relations, judges 
also redefine the institutional contours of firms and markets. The 
paper draws on economic theory regarding the institutional struc-
tures for directing and coordinating resources in production. Firm 
theorists, like Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson,27 have at-
tempted to explain why firms exist as an alternative to markets for 
organizing production, and to account for their bordering. The fa-
miliar iteration of the question is, “what determines whether a firm 
‘makes’ an input to production or instead ‘buys’ an input to pro-
                                                     
26 Lauren Edelman, et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institu-
tionalized Employment Structures, 117 AM. J. OF SOC. 888 (2011). 
27 E.g., Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver 
Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 
J. L. & Econ. 233 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Governance]; Oliver Williamson, The 
Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 Am. J. Soc. 548 (1981) 
[hereinafter Williamson, Economics]. 
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duction?” Economic theories of the firm tend to associate firms 
and markets with different legal relations: market transactions with 
contract and firm transactions with property rights or employ-
ment.28 Theories of the firm have even suggested that employment 
and independent contracting are homologous with firms and mar-
kets.29  
Due to the close relationship between employment and socio-
legal conceptions of the business form, the law’s attempt to con-
strue employment as a contract tends to destabilize boundaries be-
tween firms and markets just as it destabilizes boundaries between 
employment and non-employment. In the IC decisions, the ambi-
guity between bargaining and producing in employment reappears 
as a tension within the firm: employment as a contract is a direct 
and bilateral relationship between putatively equal parties; howev-
er, employment is also a legal rationale for a firm’s centralized 
control over indirect, hierarchical, and multilateral relations in pro-
duction. The contradiction between master-servant authority and 
contract enabled FedEx and the courts to submerge the consum-
mate firm—the Weberian bureaucracy—beneath a nexus of con-
tracts.  
Despite the indeterminacy of the legal tests for employment 
status, the IC decisions are troubling for reasons of doctrine, poli-
cy, and political legitimacy. First, they ignore—and thus answer 
incorrectly—what is arguably the underlying query in a dispute 
over whether a work relationship is employment or independent 
contracting: is the relationship more like a contract or more like a 
master-servant relationship? Secondly, in ignoring this question, 
the IC decisions thwart the policy concerns of the law with protect-
ing persons who sell their ability to work to make a living. The de-
cisions transform some of the same vulnerabilities that place the 
drivers within the policy concerns of minimum wage and collec-
tive bargaining law into evidence of their autonomy! The more the 
workers appear as interchangeable cogs in a machine, the more 
they look like independent entrepreneurs in the courts’ reasoning. 
The decisions conflate the depersonality of bureaucracy with the 
impersonality of the market. Third, the IC decisions redefine the 
                                                     
28 See infra Part IV.B. 
29 See infra Part IV.B. 
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normative relationship between the corporate form and the produc-
tive enterprise.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the legal 
tests for employment status and examines the primary explanations 
for instability in the legal identity of employment in the case law. 
Part II is the theoretical core of the argument. It shows that the 
law’s attempt to render employment a contract produces two doc-
trinal ambiguities in employment status disputes. Part III illustrates 
the first doctrinal ambiguity at work. It shows how the IC decisions 
drew on the ambiguity between bargaining and producing to rein-
terpret traditional institutional markers of employment and con-
struct the written document drivers sign as an institutional marker 
of non-employment. It also shows that their interpretation formed 
an axis of disagreement among courts considering the employment 
status of FedEx drivers. Part III also critiques how the IC decisions 
resolved the ambiguity on doctrinal and policy grounds. Part IV 
discusses the relationship between employment and economic the-
ories of the firm. It shows that the law’s attempt to fit employment 
in the legal framework of contract destabilizes classic conceptions 
of firms and markets. It also shows that, in transforming the FedEx 
drivers into independent contractors, the IC decisions transform a 
firm, as conceptualized by major theories of the firm, into a mar-
ket. They likewise conceal a highly rational bureaucracy under a 
nexus of contracts. Part IV critiques the IC decisions for thwarting 
the policy objectives of work law and hollowing out the normative 
basis of the business form. Part V illustrates the second ambiguity 
created by the fusion of master-servant authority and contract in 
the IC decisions. It analyzes and critiques the courts’ institutional 
work to construct the written document signed by drivers as a 
marker of non-employment.  
The conclusion suggests two provisional strategies to improve 
decision-making in disputes over employment status. The first is in 
the judicial repertoire: use contract law to evaluate whether the 
disputed work arrangement is more like a contract or more like a 
master-servant relationship. The second proposal is to use classic 
theories of the firm to distinguish between entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity—opportunity conferred by the market—and an employee’s 
opportunity within a firm.  
Nonetheless, because legal ambiguity in contemporary work 
relations is based on a contradiction at the heart of the employment 
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contract—a contradiction between contractual equality and servi-
tude—the article concludes that doctrinal adjustments will not re-
solve the problem. Only a radical transformation in work relations 
will stabilize the legal identity of work relations and prevent deci-
sion-makers from redefining relations of subordination as relations 
of equality.  
  
I. EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
A. The Legal Tests  
 The definition of the employment contract is working for an-
other, under the other’s right of control.30 The dominant expression 
of this definition as a legal standard is the means-ends standard. 
Courts ask, does the alleged employer control only the “ends” of 
the work or does it also control the “means” of the work?31  
 Most statutes do not include their own definition of employ-
ment, so courts and agencies are largely responsible for construct-
ing the employment relationship out of this definition and standard. 
Almost all of the tests for employment status under state, federal, 
and local law are variations of two, overlapping tests: the common 
law master-servant agency test32 and the economic realities test.33  
                                                     
30 E.g., Kelley v. S. Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318 (1974). 
31 Local 777 1978, 897, quoting Party Cab 1949, 92. 
32 The federal agency test governs claims under ERISA, the NLRA, Title VII, ADA, 
ADEA, OSHA, the Copyright Act, and whenever a statute does not provide a construc-
tive definition of employment. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992); 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); Clackamas Gastro-
enterology Assoc.s v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003).  
33 The economic realities test governs cases under the FLSA, Migrant Workers and 
Agricultural Workers Protection Act (MWAWPA), Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 
and many state wage and hour laws. The economic realities test includes many agency 
test factors. The central differences are that the former asks whether the worker is “eco-
nomically dependent” on the alleged employer and allows courts to consider statutory 
purpose. Cf. Darden, 503 U.S. 318; NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 
85, 91–92 (1995). The Supreme Court intended the test to be broader than the agency 
test. Darden, 503 U.S. at _; Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 725; 
Hearst, 322 U.S. at 127; Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 70 (2d Cir. 2003). 
See also Bruce Goldstein, et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern Ameri-
can Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 
983 (1998); Marc Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage under the National La-
bor Relations Act: Making Room for Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors, 
and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 555 (1988). Whether in practice courts 
interpret employment more broadly under the economic realities test is subject to dispute. 
(continued next page) 
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 Under the federal tests, and under most state versions, judges 
consider an open-ended list of indicia as evidence bearing on the 
control question or as secondary evidence of employment status. 
The Restatement (2nd) of Agency, an influential secondary sum-
mary of the common law, lists several factors:  
 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the mas-
ter may exercise over the details of the work;  
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business;  
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision;  
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;  
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the in-
strumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person 
doing the work;  
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;  
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the 
job;  
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business 
of the employer;  
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the 
relation of master and servant; and  
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business. 34 
 
Additional factors that judges tend to consider include whether 
the worker works exclusively for the alleged employer or also ser-
vices other clients; whether the worker conducts business in its 
own name; whether the work presents opportunities for entrepre-
neurial gain and loss; the extent of supervision; whether the alleged 
employer provides training; whether the worker is subject to disci-
pline; whether the worker has the right to quit; whether the alleged 
employer can terminate the worker; whether the worker can turn 
                                                                                                                       
Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors, supra note _; Benjamin F. Burry, Test-
ing Economic Reality: FLSA and Title VII Protection for Workfare Participants, 2009 
Univ. Chic. Leg. Forum 561 (2009); J.F. Harris, Worker Unity and the Law: A Compara-
tive Analysis of the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act, and 
the Hope for the NLRA’s Future, 13 N.Y. City L. Rev. 107 (2009).  
34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). 
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down assignments and whether the alleged employer can assign 
additional assignments; and whether the alleged employer assigns 
daily work. Courts also consider whether the alleged employer 
provides benefits or withholds payroll taxes.35  
 
B. Other Explanations  
 There are two primary explanations for why “the law can’t tell 
an employee when it sees one”36: imprecision in the legal tests for 
employment and a decline in industrial employment.  
 
 1. Decline of Standard, Industrial Employment 
One explanation for the widespread disagreement among judg-
es regarding the identity of employment is the disappearance of 
industrial work models around which the legal standards for em-
ployment status were conceived. The industrial model of work, or 
Fordism, involved a long-term, direct relationship between a work-
er with routinized responsibilities and a hierarchical, vertically in-
tegrated firm. The firm produced and traded in its own name and 
paid a family wage.37 Scholars suggest that, because the law was 
modeled on this “standard” employment relationship, it has diffi-
culty apprehending post-industrial work. Many post-industrial rela-
tionships, like temporary agency work, part-time work, subcon-
tracting, and networked production, are not characterized by the 
long-term, direct attachment of an employee to a single firm.38 The 
argument is that work is changing, but the law is not. 
 
                                                     
35 E.g., Darden, 503 U.S. at 323; Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 
490 U.S. 730, 751-52; Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992). 
36 Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One 
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 295 (2001). 
37 See Antonio Gramsci, Americanism and Fordism, in PRISON NOTEBOOKS 286 
(1971); STONE, WIDGETS, supra note _. Fordism also refers to a post-WWII regime of 
accumulation, or the particular relationship between production and consumption that 
was possible because many large industrial firms paid a family or living wage. The epo-
nym of “Fordism” is Henry Ford, who famously introduced the $5 wage so that every 
Ford Motor worker could afford to purchase a Ford automobile.  
38 STONE, WIDGETS, supra note _.  
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 2. Legal Imprecision 
Another explanation for the inability of judges to agree on em-
ployment status is imprecision in the legal tests.39 For purposes of 
most statutes regulating employment, judges must consider a long, 
non-exclusive list of factors to determine employment status. 
Courts disagree on how many are necessary and which ones in 
what combinations are the most important. Standards that define 
employment by open-ended enumeration necessarily lead to incon-
sistent results like reading tealeaves. Further, the means-end stand-
ard is amenable to nearly infinite manipulation. Courts can always 
find some residual discretion left to the putative contractor, and 
they can describe the “ends” at the level of detail necessary for the 
employer to maintain complete control.40 
 
 3. A Challenge 
The FedEx disputes challenge these explanations. The drivers’ 
work relationship fits what scholars have referred to as standard, 
industrial employment—a long-term, full-time, direct relationship 
between a worker and large firm that trades and produces under a 
coherent business identity. The drivers have routinized responsibil-
ities in an integrated production process, and they work under hier-
archical, centralized management. Drivers must work 9 or 9.5 to 
11 hours of work per day, five-days a week. Drivers must wear 
uniforms and punch in and out of work. They are subject to a sys-
tem of supervision, performance evaluation, and discipline, all of 
which managers document in personnel files. They receive annual 
vacation, and performance bonuses. Most drivers work for FedEx 
for many years.  
Almost all of the other features that are evidence of employ-
ment status under the legal tests are also present in the drivers’ re-
lationship: FedEx provides all of the tools of work, with the excep-
                                                     
39 E.g., id. (arguing that no factor on its own is reliable evidence of employment). 
40 One judge parodied the means-ends inquiry as follows: “Thus laborers are em-
ployed to empty a carload of coal. The employer insists that he does not control them, 
that he did not hire their ‘services’ but only contracted for the ‘result,’ an empty car. The 
means of unloading, he says, are their own, i.e., they can shovel right-handed or left-
handed, start at one end of the car or the other.” Powell v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Employ-
ment Sec. Commission, 345 Mich. 455, 472 (1956) (dissent) (internal citations omitted). 
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tion of the trucks, which drivers must purchase. FedEx decides 
which trucks are acceptable and their specifications, down to the 
shelving dimensions and material and acceptable brands of white 
paint. FedEx restricts drivers’ ability to use the trucks for non-
work purposes. The work is unskilled, and FedEx trains drivers in 
its service procedures. The work is part of FedEx’s regular and 
core business. Drivers’ pay is based primarily on the hours they 
work. FedEx assigns mandatory tasks on a daily basis. Drivers 
must follow extensive rules on driving, personal appearance, vehi-
cle appearance, handling packages, and interacting with FedEx 
customers. Drivers have one customer—they sell their delivery 
services only to FedEx. Drivers who perform exactly the same 
work (FedEx drivers employed by a temp agency)41 or very similar 
work are employees. The latter include drivers for FedEx’s main 
competitors, UPS and DHS, and drivers for the company division 
FedEx Express. 
Based on the main accounts for instability in the legal identity 
of employment, FedEx drivers should not be a hard case. However, 
the different case outcomes are not a product of disagreement re-
garding how to count, weigh, and balance a bevy of pro and con 
features under the legal tests. The D.C. Circuit and Judge Miller 
acknowledged that many factors probative of employment under 
the governing tests were present. They reinterpreted this evidence 
as evidence consistent with, or evidence of, non-employment. 
 
II. CONSTRUING MASTER-SERVANT AUTHORITY AS “CONTRACT” 
A. History of the Employment Contract 
 The employment contract—working for another under the right 
of control of the other—is a product of the 19th century combina-
tion of the legal relationship between master and servant with the 
legal relationship of contract. Judges and treatise writers reconfig-
                                                     
41 In some of the FedEx cases, drivers could choose to become FedEx drivers as the 
formal employees of a temp agency that contracted with FedEx rather than as a FedEx 
contractor. Drivers underwent the same training and performed the same work whether 
hired as contractors or temporary employees. FedEx Home Delivery, Nos. 1-RC-22034, 
1-RC-22035, 2006 NLRB Reg. Dir. Dec. LEXIS 264 at 20, 25, 40, 53-54 (Sept. 20, 
2006), vacated, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). [hereinafter FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. deci-
sion 2006]. 
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ured the master’s property-like right to the servant’s labor services 
as a right based in contract, a doctrine enabling parties to reach en-
forceable agreements in commodity exchanges. As they transferred 
the legal rationale for subordination to contract, courts expanded 
master-servant authority to cover a wide range of work relation-
ships in which workers were not previously subject to this authori-
ty. With the development of larger-scale production, judges ex-
panded master-servant agency authority to cover not just the right 
to direct a single worker or group of workers in a shop, but to justi-
fy managerial coordination and direction of the enterprise.42  
Karl Marx suggested that, in the remarkable creation of value 
that occurred through the capitalist’s purchase of labor power and 
the process of converting labor power into labor, the “laws that 
regulate the exchange of commodities have been in no way violat-
ed.”43 He was, perhaps, too cavalier. Employment is not a contract, 
and the attempt to fit employment in the legal framework of con-
tract produces intractable problems of interpretation. 
 
B. Fitting Employment into Contract 
1. The Problem of Consideration 
To see why it is so difficult to construe employment as a con-
tract, first, take the issue of at-will employment, and the contractu-
al requirements of consideration and mutual assent. Recall that the 
definition of employment is an agreement to work for another, un-
der the other’s right of control. By default, employment is at-
will.44 Subject to limited exceptions, either party may terminate the 
relationship at any time, for a good reason, bad reason, or no rea-
                                                     
42 CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (1993); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870 
(1991). 
43 KARL MARX, CAPITAL, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 452, 505 (2d ed., Da-
vid McClellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1867). 
44 As contractual defaults go, the at-will default is particularly stubborn. Even when 
evidence discloses clear party intent to contract out of the at-will default, courts tend to 
be resistant to enforcing the term or permanent employment contracts. See e.g., Asmus v. 
Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000).  
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son.45 Enforceable contracts generally require consideration—a 
bargained for promise or performance in return for a promise. The 
option of the return promise is unavailable in at-will employment: 
the employee agrees follow the employer’s commands so long as 
she feels like it. The employer agrees to provide work in exchange 
for pay so long as she feels like it. This is a quintessential case of 
illusory consideration. Neither party commits with a promise.46  
Therefore, the employee provides consideration through per-
formance. The employee “assents” to the employer’s “offer” of 
work by following the employer’s directions in the course of the 
work. Likewise, the employer makes a contractual offer by direct-
ing the employee in the work. If employment is a contract, it in-
volves a continuing renewal of offer and acceptance at each mo-
ment the employee works under the employer’s direction.47 The 
employee bargains over the terms and conditions of work by satis-
factorily following the employer’s instructions. The employer bar-
gains as it directs the work, for instance, now telling the employee 
to work faster, now to perform additional work, now to stay late. 
Thus, in employment, the parties bargain and perform their deal at 
the same time. Employment is not a unilateral contract, however, 
in which one provides consideration for the promise through per-
formance. Both employee and employer exchange performances, 
                                                     
45 The only limits on the employer’s authority to terminate an employee are the 
carve-outs provided by statute and a handful of judicially created public policy excep-
tions. Statutory exceptions include, for instance, the prohibition in Title VII against ter-
minating employees on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, or gender. Public 
policy exceptions often restrict employers for terminating employees who refuse to 
commit perjury or who miss work for jury duty. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Dismissal 
Law in the United States: The Past and Present of At-Will Employment, in 
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATIVE ON SOCIAL EUROPE (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1342667. 
46 C.f. Petroleum Refractionating Corp. v. Kendrick Oil Co., 65 F.2d 997, 999 (10th 
Cir. 1933). 
47 See also JOHN R. COMMONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM 285 (1924) 
(“The labor contract is therefore not a contract, it is a continuing implied renewal of con-
tracts at every minute and every hour, based on the continuance of what is deemed, on the 
employer’s side, to be satisfactory service, and, on the laborer’s side, what is deemed to 
be satisfactory conditions and compensation”; Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 
(1972). 
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not a promise for a performance. They bargain and they produce at 
the same time.48  
To further understand, consider that, by definition, the employ-
ee does not provide labor for pay through employment: employ-
ment is an agreement to work for another, to provide labor effort. 
(An agreement to exchange consummated work, labor, is an inde-
pendent contracting agreement.) Based on the very nature of labor 
effort and the contractual requirement of assent, the parties cannot 
use contract to exchange labor effort: An employer cannot direct 
the employee’s labor effort without the latter’s ongoing assent.49 
This is why a lease theory of employment does not ease the fit of 
employment in the Procrustean bed of contract. Hiring an employ-
ee in some ways looks like renting an asset capable of producing 
value—the employer leases the worker’s ability to labor. A lessee 
has a property right in the leased goods to use and control them, to 
extract as much value out of them as possible. However, the em-
ployer cannot squeeze anything out of the employee—it cannot put 
in motion the capacity to produce value that it has leased—without 
the latter’s simultaneous engagement of her will. The use and con-
trol of this value-producing asset requires that the employee con-
tinuously renew her contractual assent. The father of institutional 
economics, John Commons remarked, “His [the worker’s] bargain-
ing is his act of producing something for the employer and his pro-
ducing something acceptable is his method of bargaining.” The 
“laborer is thus continuously on the labor market—even while he 
is working at his job he is both producing and bargaining, and the 
two are inseparable.”50 
The problem is, we cannot distinguish the employment rela-
tionship from the independent contracting relationship unless we 
can distinguish when the parties are bargaining from when they are 
producing. The means-ends standard depends on the ability to rec-
ognize when the parties are on the “market” and when they are in 
the abode of production: The right to contract over the terms and 
                                                     
48 The 13th Amendment prohibition on involuntary servitude is likely an obstacle to 
exchanging labor effort as a contractual commodity. In the 19th century, judges began to 
find that indentured servitude could be “involuntary,” even if the servant initially agreed 
to the arrangement voluntarily. STEINFELD, supra note _, at 144-145. 
49 If we could alienate the capacity to will, we would not have the capacity to con-
tract. 
50 COMMONS, supra note _, at 285. 
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conditions of the labor services is a feature of both employment 
and independent contracting. What distinguishes employment is 
whether there is control over production. The employer controls 
the “means and manner” of the work, not just the “ends” of the 
work, over which all parties have a right to drive hard bargains. 
Since contracting and producing are simultaneous in employment, 
however, employer and employee never conclude a contractual 
negotiation and proceed to a discrete activity of producing. In em-
ployment, contractual formation regarding the “ends” of the work 
is simultaneous to producing—the “means” of the work or contrac-
tual performance. Independence in contracting is simultaneously 
subordination in production.  
 
2. The Problem of Indefiniteness  
Regardless of whether the employment is at-will, the promise 
as consideration option is generally unavailable in employment, 
because it would tend to create contracts too indefinite to enforce. 
Further, to save some contracts from indefiniteness and to police 
the conduct of the parties, courts will imply contractual terms or 
use other gap-fillers. They do not do so when interpreting em-
ployment agreements.  
Again, by definition, the employee agrees to obey the employ-
er’s instructions; however, these instructions will often determine 
essential parts of the bargain.51 In particular, employment lacks a 
quantity term—the employee agrees to place his or her energies 
under the employer’s right of control, and the employer promises a 
certain payment.52 The exchange is for an indefinite amount of la-
bor for a definite amount of payment. How much labor the em-
ployee provides is determined in the course of production. The 
employer seeks to convert the employee’s capacities into as much 
                                                     
51 Promises to obey one party's reasonable instructions when these promises would 
not give one party the right to determine something as important as the quantity term tend 
to be acceptable. For instance, a bailor may agree to follow the bailee’s reasonable in-
structions about how to handle its property, or a seller might promise to follow a buyer’s 
reasonable directions regarding delivery.  
52 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (2012) (requiring quantity term in contracts); see 
also id. § 2-306 cmts. 1–3 (requiring good faith when conforming to quantity estimates); 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95 (1989) (discussing UCC default rules for filling in 
price and quantity terms). 
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completed work as possible; the employee seeks to regulate this 
intensity. Critical terms of the conversion tend to go specified: 
How hard should the employee work? How fast? With what rights 
to object?53 Employment resembles the unenforceable “agreement 
to agree.”54  
Employees and employers can bargain about many features of 
the relationship, and they may seek to limit the employer’s other-
wise nearly unlimited right to dispose of the employee’s capacities. 
With limited exceptions, provided mainly by statute, the terms are 
unenforceable. Rather than rights to damages or equitable relief, 
the parties have the right to exit the relationship. 
While all contracts are incomplete, employment is incomplete 
by design. Outside bodies, like courts or arbitrators, have authority 
to interpret non-employment contracts. Contract law has a reper-
toire of interpretive principles and standardized terms to fill con-
tractual gaps and ambiguities.55 Their content may be based on, for 
example, industry standards, a course of dealing or performance 
between the parties, or relevant statute. Further, the courts imply a 
covenant of good faith in other contracts. In a non-employment 
contract, the parties may agree that one party will have discretion 
to interpret contractual terms and fill certain gaps; however, courts 
or arbitrators determine whether the interpretation is consistent 
with the parties’ intent and not an abuse of discretion.56  
By contrast, when courts and treatise writers incorporated mas-
ter-servant status into contracts for labor services, they gave the 
employer an implied authority to determine unspecified or ambig-
uous elements of the agreement.57 Employers are generally not 
                                                     
53 SELZNICK 134-35; ALAN FOX, BEYOND CONTRACT 183-84 (1974); JAMES B. 
ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 11-15 (1983). See also 
U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1, § 2-306 cmts. 1-3 (2013); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, supra note 
_. 
54 C.f. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470, 
471 (N.Y. 1923) (“agreement to agree” unenforceable).  
55 In commercial requirements and outputs contracts, for example, which also lack a 
specified quantity for exchange, courts require exclusive dealings to support a contract, 
will impute “reasonable” maximum and minimum quantities, and impose a duty of good 
faith. E.g., Mid-South Packers, Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc., 761 F.2d 1117 (5th Cir. 1985); 
U.C.C. § 2-306 cmts. 1-3, 5 (2013).  
56 See, e.g., Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187 (N.H. 1989). 
57 Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment Relationship, in 
LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 71–98, 74 (Christopher L. 
Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992). 
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subject to the scrutiny of contract law as to whether the employer’s 
interpretation of the agreement comports with the parties’ intent, or 
whether the employer is performing the agreement in good faith. 
For instance, the court will not imply a term that would limit an 
employee’s duty to obey the employer to the latter’s “reasonable” 
commands. This implied right includes circumstances where the 
employer seems unilaterally to change agreed-upon terms.58 The 
basic remedy is exit. The essence of the employment contract is 
extra-contractual discretion.59  
 
C. Employment and Power 
What does it mean then to say the employer has a “right” to 
control the work of an employee? It means, simply, that we can 
recognize something as an employment relationship when one par-
ty to a agreement for labor services has such greater bargaining 
power that it can impose its will on the other: The right to control 
the work means the employer will likely get its way in the course 
of the parties’ negotiations. The legal definition of the employment 
contract registers the inequality of bargaining power between em-
ployer and employee.  
 
D. Interpretative Ambiguities 
 The tension between master-servant authority and contract 
limned above creates two interpretative ambiguities in disputes 
over employment status. The first, explained above, is to make 
ambiguous the activities of bargaining over the work and carrying 
out the work.  
The second ambiguity, surfaces in attempts to interpret a writ-
ten work agreement, rather than in distinguishing the activities of 
                                                     
58 FOX, supra note __, at 183-84; see also ATLESON, supra note _, at 13; SELZNICK, 
supra note _, at 132, 136; Ayres & Gertner, supra note _. The ability to quit does not 
afford both parties equal rights to interpret the contract. When an employer pays less than 
agreed upon, the employee generally must look for relief to an statute requiring payment 
of promised wages. Likewise, employees seeking promised bonuses, commissions, holi-
days, other benefits, or damages from broken promises regarding the former must gener-
ally look for a relevant state statute.  
59 Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment Relationship, in 
LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 71–98, 74 (Christopher L. 
Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992). 
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bargaining and producing. The means-ends standard depicts em-
ployment as a contract, but a peculiar kind of contract. In ordinary 
contracts, parties commit one another to the “ends” of the deal, but 
neither has a right to dictate how the other party satisfies these 
ends. The employment contract, however, gives one party an im-
plied right to determine how the other party satisfies its contractual 
duties: the employer has a right to control not only the “ends” of 
the work, but also the “means” of the work. The means-ends 
standard therefore depends on being able to distinguish between 
contractual duties and the manner of their performance, in order to 
evaluate whether one party is controlling the latter but not the for-
mer. The problem, again, is that the fusion of master-servant au-
thority with contract makes illusory any distinction between con-
tractual duties and how they are performed. Employer and employ-
ee exchange performance for performance and determine their con-
tractual duties as they produce. In employment, we cannot identify 
the contractual duties.  
Part V illustrates how this ambiguity turns the interpretation of 
a written work agreement into a puzzle in disputes over employ-
ment status. The IC decisions take the position that everything 
stated in the written document the drivers signed states a contrac-
tual end, which, by definition prohibits FedEx from controlling 
how drivers perform these ends. Other courts recognized that the 
contract by its terms gave FedEx a right to control the contracted-
for ends or collapsed the distinction altogether, revealing an em-
ployment relationship.  
In sum, the attempt to fit employment in the framework of con-
tract creates an ambiguity between the activities of bargaining and 
producing, and an ambiguity between contractual duties and how 
they are performed. Both make the dominant standard for distin-
guishing employment from independent contracting relation-
ships—the means-end standard—irresolvable. Applying the 
means-end standard requires distinguishing the activities of bar-
gaining and producing, and, when interpreting a written agreement, 
distinguishing between contractual duties and the way in which 
they are performed.  
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E. Employment as Institution 
Marx referred to the market, “within whose boundaries the sale 
and purchase of labour power goes on,” as a “very Eden of the in-
nate rights of man,” where “alone rule Freedom, Equality, Proper-
ty, and Bentham.” Employer and employee then “desert[]” this 
“noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in 
view of all men” and enter the “hidden abode of production.”60  
However, since employer and employee negotiate and produce 
at the same time, since the means-ends standard cannot distinguish 
between contractual duties and their performance, how do judges 
distinguish the “noisy sphere” from the “hidden abode of produc-
tion?” How do they distinguish where parties meet as equals—in 
contract—from where they meet as superior and subordinate—in 
production? The apparent coordinates of contracting and produc-
tion in time and space are artifacts of practice. The intelligibility of 
employment is dependent on its institutionalization.  
In an industrial manufacturing firm, human resources personnel 
might hire the worker and explain salary and benefits. Later, dis-
tinct personnel in a manufacturing division might supervise the 
worker on the factory floor. These organizational markers of indus-
trial employment separated the productive process from the sorting 
of workers in the labor market and the contracting process. Judges 
interpreting nonstandard work must find a way to makes sense of 
the disorganized temporal, spatial, and bureaucratic markers of in-
dustrial employment.  
NLRB v. Labor Ready61 illustrates the task. This NLRA case 
concerned a non-solicitation policy that a temporary employment 
agency’s imposed in its waiting area. The legality of the policy de-
pended on whether persons registered with the agency were em-
ployees of the agency while they were waiting for assignments. 
The company argued that, although it was mandatory for regis-
trants to be in the waiting room in order to receive job placements, 
their employment relationship with the agency ended between each 
assignment or after each day of work. The court rejected this ar-
gument. It argued that requiring registrants’ physical presence at 
                                                     
60 KARL MARX, CAPITAL, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 452, 492 (2d ed., Da-
vid McClellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (1867). 
61 NLRB v. Labor Ready, Inc., 253 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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the agency to receive assignments was a form of control over their 
work; the employment relationship continued between assign-
ments.  
The work arrangement in Labor Ready lacked the temporal, 
spatial, and bureaucratic markers of the prototypical industrial firm 
that separated the hiring process from supervisory direction. The 
company interpreted registrants looking for jobs in the waiting 
room as an aspect of labor market sorting, or contracting. The 
court, in contrast, interpreted the waiting room requirement as an 
part of the company’s process of producing its saleable service, 
which was to make workers available on-demand to client firms.  
The FedEx disputes, and the IC decisions in particular, suggest 
that the law’s attempt to construe employment as a contract renders 
even those work relations approaching the prototype of industrial 
employment susceptible to redefinition.  
 
III. FROM BARGAINING TO PRODUCING 
The way that FedEx organized the drivers’ work manipulated 
the ambiguities in the employment contract between bargaining 
and producing. This enabled the courts to find that features of the 
work that under the legal tests would be probative of an employ-
ment relationship were here consistent with, or even evidence of, 
an independent contracting relationship. The IC decisions mar-
shaled the ambiguity between producing and contracting to negate 
or invert the legal meaning of nearly every factor under the legal 
tests indicative of employment and to transform several features 
typical of industrial work into evidence of entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity: delivery route assignments, supervision, discipline, promo-
tions, shift replacements, training, skill, tenure, at-will authority, 
scheduling, and other work rules. 
 
A. Route Assignments, Training, and Execution of the Contract as 
Institutional Marker  
1. Control or Entrepreneurial Opportunity? 
In what we think of as the formation of a “typical” employment 
arrangement, a worker applies for a job. If accepted, the worker 
meets with Human Resources personnel, perhaps signs an agree-
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ment, and then receives a desk, a phone—whatever the required 
equipment for the job. And, often the worker receives training 
from the company or participates in orientation.  
For FedEx drivers, the sequence differs. A potential driver 
completes a computerized application and undergoes a physical 
examination and drug screening.62 Next, those approved by FedEx 
who do not have satisfactory commercial driving experience must 
take a training course.63 Some approved drivers also received train-
ing from FedEx and began working as FedEx drivers through a 
temporary agency.64 To become permanent, the applicant must buy 
or lease a truck. Until 2008, FedEx furnished or financed trucks for 
sale or lease to drivers.65 The truck must fit FedEx’s detailed speci-
fications (down to the brand and shade of white paint) for FedEx 
trucks generally and must be approved for a particular delivery 
route.66 Only after all this would a FedEx terminal manager pre-
sent the driver with a written agreement. Only in signing the 
agreement does the driver officially receive the delivery route and 
become a FedEx driver.67  
Ordinarily, assigning a worker to a particular service area or a 
driver to a particular delivery route,68 and training a worker,69 are 
                                                     
62 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 10-12; Fedex Home Delivery, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
63 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 562-63; FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 
at 11-12; 
64 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 10; FedEx Ground Package Sys., Case 22-
RC-12508, slip op. at 26 (Nov. 2, 2004); Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 
2014 WL 4926198 at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014). Drivers performed the same work whether 
hired as contractors or temporary employees. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 11; 
Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
65 Up until 2008, FedEx purchased custom-made trucks and sold or leased them to 
potential drivers. FedEx continued to maintain relationships with outside vendors willing 
to finance FedEx drivers. Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 566; Estrada, 154 
Cal.App.4th at 12. 
66 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 11-12, 13, 17-18; FHD, 563 F.3d at 501; 
Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 565-66, 592; Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package 
Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 
765 F.3d 1033, 3 (9th Cir. 2014). 
67 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 13-14; Fedex Home Delivery, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *4 (Sept. 30, 2014). See also Deposition of Pen-
ny Massa at 4-6, Multi-state decision, 758 F.Supp.2d 638, 2005 WL 5865334 (No. 3-05-
MD-527-RM).  
68 See, e.g., Solis v. Velocity Exp., Inc., No. CV 09-864-MO, 2010 WL 3259917, at 
*7 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2010). 
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evidence of employer control over production—evidence of em-
ployment.  
FedEx, however, suggested that drivers’ meetings with termi-
nal managers were part of the bargaining process.70 Thus, the work 
relationship did not really begin until after the drivers signed the 
contract. For instance, according to the former CEO of FedEx, 
when a driver checked with a manager to see if a certain truck 
would be permissible for the route to be assigned, it presented 
FedEx with a “business plan.”71 FedEx manipulated the ambiguity 
within the employment contract by relocating the conventional 
threshold between bargaining and production in industrial, or typi-
cal,” employment (Figure 1). Everything that fell on the pre-
contract signing side of the relationship appears as part of the mar-
ket sorting or bargaining process.  
 
 
In reality, drivers had little leeway to make rational investment 
decisions based on their “proprietary interest.” FedEx maintained 
                                                                                                                       
69 See, e.g., Crawford v. State, 845 P.2d 703, 706-07 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); NLRB. 
v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 259 (1968). 
70 Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 6-7, 52-53, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 
4425826 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).  
71 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 565-566. 
8/12/2015] From Hierarchies to Markets 29 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
strict control over the volume of package deliveries in each service 
area. Using advanced logistics technology and supervisory ride-
alongs, it structured drivers’ routes so that each driver would have 
9-11 hours of deliveries per day.72 Regardless of the desirability of 
a driver’s initial route assignment, FedEx had the right to alter the 
routes unilaterally and regularly did so to distribute work some-
what evenly among drivers.73 (The document the drivers signed 
expressly stated that a driver’s “proprietary” interest was limited to 
their service area “as that area is configured from time to time” 
unilaterally by FedEx.74) Drivers were required to deliver every 
package FedEx assigned to them each day. Further, although a 
property right usually includes the right to exclude, FedEx adjusted 
packages among drivers daily. Drivers were required to deliver 
packages outside of delivery areas and to allow other drivers to 
make deliveries in their own service areas.75 And, if delivery vol-
ume increased on a particular route, under the driver’s compensa-
tion formula, FedEx offset the increase in piece rate earnings for 
packages by decreasing the driver’s daily wage, which was in-
versely correlated to delivery volume and geographic density.76 
FedEx largely predetermined drivers’ pay based on hours of 
work.77 By design, bargaining over delivery areas was not a mean-
ingful source of entrepreneurial opportunity for most drivers.  
                                                     
72 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 570, 589, 590, 591. See generally Richard Ma-
son, James L. McKenney, Walter Carlson, and Duncan Copeland, Absolutely, Positively 
Operations Research: The Federal Express Story, 27 INTERFACES 17 (1997). See also 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Case 22-RC-12508, slip op. at 75 (Nov. 2, 2004) (FedEx 
supervisor took into account how much break-time driver took in determining route struc-
ture). 
73 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 573-574; FedEx Ground Package Sys., Case 
22-RC-12508, slip op. at 54 (Nov. 2, 2004). 
74 See Pick-up and Delivery Contractor Operating Agreement at ¶ 5.2, Exhibit, De-
fendant’s Memorandum of Law and Supplemental Statement in Opposition to Leighter 
(Oregon) Motion for Class Certification, Leighter v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 
2007 WL 6930366 (N.D.Ind. 2007) [hereinafter Operating Agreement]. 
 
75 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 561, 569-70; Brief of Petitioner/Cross-
Respondent at 6-7, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 4425826 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436); 
Operating Agreement at ¶ 5.1. 
76 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 567, 589; Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package 
Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2014).  
77 See, e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 567 (daily wage rate calculated based 
on hours of assigned work); Deposition of Michael Callahan, Kansas decision, 734 
(continued next page) 
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However, the courts finding the drivers to be independent con-
tractors largely followed FedEx’s cues with respect to the compa-
ny’s manipulation of the institutional markers of industrial em-
ployment. They did not find the route assignments to be evidence 
of FedEx’s right to control the means of the work.78 The D.C. Cir-
cuit suggested that route assignments were evidence of entrepre-
neurial opportunity, because a driver might acquire a delivery route 
with expanding package volume.79 Judge Miller suggested they 
went to FedEx’s control only over “results” of the work; he charac-
terized them not as an assignment of work by FedEx, but as a driv-
er’s contractual agreement to service a particular area.80 Both 
courts emphasized drivers’ contracted-for “proprietary” rights as 
key to their finding that drivers were independent contractors, on 
the basis that it revealed their entrepreneurial opportunity.81 The IC 
decisions thus reinterpreted delivery area assignments as evidence 
of independence in bargaining rather than dependence in produc-
ing.  
The courts also reinterpreted or lessened the import of the driv-
ers’ training and FedEx’s control over the delivery vehicles. Judge 
Miller asserted that the training drivers underwent before signing 
the contract “isn’t training, but a precondition, to becoming a con-
tractor.”82 The D.C. Circuit suggested that the training requirement 
was insubstantial evidence of employment status in the FedEx sit-
uation, merely reflecting the results the drivers contracted to pro-
vide, or the “type of service the contractors are providing rather 
                                                                                                                       
F.Supp.2d 557, 2005 WL 5865335 (No. 3:05-MD-527-RM); FedEx Ground Package 
Sys., Case 22-RC-12508, slip op. at 44-45 (Nov. 2, 2004).  
78 FHD, 563 F.3d 492; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557. 
79 FHD, 563 F.3d at 500 (arguing “routes are geographically defined, and they likely 
have value dependent on those geographic specifics which some contractors can better 
exploit than others. For example, as people move into an area, the ability to profit from 
that migration varies”). 
80 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 589 (“Various provisions of the Operating 
Agreement authorize FedEx to control the days of service, the contractor's daily work-
load, and certain time windows when pick-ups and deliveries must be made. These re-
quirements weigh in favor of employee status, but are more suggestive of a results-
oriented approach to management when viewed with the totality of circumstances.”) 
81 FHD, 563 F.3d at 502, 503; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596-97, 601. 
82 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 563. Based in part on the additional training 
FedEx provided after drivers signed the agreement, Judge Miller found that the training 
factor weighed somewhat in favor of employee status. Id. at 595. 
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than differences in the employment relationship.”83 Agreeing with 
FedEx,84 the D.C. Circuit suggested that drivers “invested” in an 
independent business by purchasing or leasing FedEx trucks.85 
FedEx’s manipulation of the bargaining/producing ambiguity 
formed a basis for disagreement among the courts. Several other 
courts found the route assignments to be evidence that the drivers 
were employees. 86 For example, in two decisions, the 9th Circuit 
argued that the route assignments were evidence of FedEx’s con-
trol over the means of the work, not merely the results.87 The Kan-
sas Supreme Court remarked, “the procedure by which a driver 
becomes qualified to deliver packages for FedEx more closely re-
sembles the process by which employees are hired than the process 
by which independent contractor agreements are negotiated. 88 
The extent that drivers “invested” in their own businesses was 
also a point of disagreement. The NLRB and a federal district court 
suggested the FedEx-specific nature of the vehicles and their use of 
the trucks for a regular and integral service of the alleged employ-
er’s business augured an employment relationship.89 The Kansas 
Supreme Court argued that requiring drivers to purchase some of 
the tools of work did not so much show that drivers invested in 
                                                     
83 FHD, 563 F.3d at 501. 
84 Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 24, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 
4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436). 
85 The D.C. Circuit characterized the requirement that drivers purchase or lease 
FedEx trucks as drivers “suppl[ying] their own equipment” and argued that this indicated 
entrepreneurial opportunity. FHD, 563 F.3d at 498, 503. The 9th Circuit, though it ulti-
mately found the drivers to be employees as a matter of law, also found the tools factor, 
when considered alone, to weigh slightly in favor of independent contractor status. Alex-
ander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014); Slayman v. FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, 10 (9th Cir. 2014). 
86 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, 82-83 (Kan. 2014); Wells 
v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, 1019 (E.D. Mo. 2013) (noting that 
service areas were “assigned” by FedEx and suggesting that true independent contractors 
found their own work). 
87 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014). 
88 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, at *807 (Kan. 2014). 
89 Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *19 (Sept. 30, 
2014) (noting that investment in FedEx trucks and equipment suggests long-term rela-
tionship). Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, at *6, 13 (E.D. Mo. 
2013). 
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their own businesses, but rather that they invested in their FedEx 
jobs.90  
 
2. Contract Execution as Temporal, Institutional Marker 
Since the legal standard cannot distinguish where employer and 
employee meet as equals—in contract—from where they meet as 
superior and subordinate—we create institutional markers to do so. 
Like a Human Resources department or other bureaucratic marker, 
the written contract appears as an institutional index tab: It pur-
ports to divide the work relationship into distinct and legally cog-
nizable segments—the ends of the work and the means of the 
work, or contractual negotiation and performance.  
FedEx and the IC decisions construct the contract signing as an 
institutional marker of non-employment: everything that happens 
before the contract signing is bargaining over the work; only what 
happens afterwards is production. A driver’s execution of a written 
agreement signals the relationship is one of independent contract-
ing by marking a clear break between the negotiation process and 
the endowment of enforceable rights.91  
 
3. A Critique 
Despite the inherent ambiguity within the employment contract 
between bargaining and producing, the construction of the execu-
tion of the written agreement as an institutional marker of non-
employment is problematic for both doctrinal and policy reasons. 
The written document the drivers sign is not performing the work 
of a contract: it is not separating the market sorting and bargaining 
process from the carrying out of an enforceable contract. 
                                                     
90 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, at *822-23 (Kan. 2014). 
Given that in several cases drivers suing under statutes that prohibited employers from 
charging employees for business expenses, it seems rather circular to argue that requiring 
drivers to buy or lease their work trucks was evidence of the law’s inapplicability, rather 
than evidence of FedEx’s violation of the law (in spirit). 
91 For another example, see Solis v. Velocity Express, No. CV 09-864-MO, 2010 
WL 3259917 at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2010), an overtime case involving a shipping com-
pany that converted its delivery drivers from employees to independent contractors. The 
court queried whether the company’s route assignments were evidence of the company’s 
“control over its workers or simply an unprofitable contractual bargain.” It found that the 
“critical evidence” was that drivers “received their route assignments after they contract-
ed with Velocity Express.” Id. at *6 (emphasis added).  
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As a doctrinal matter, drivers begin submitting to FedEx’s au-
thority as employees before they sign the agreement. They receive 
training and begin following FedEx’s directions in acquiring and 
outfitting a truck for an assigned route. The relationship is closer to 
that of a master-servant relationship than a contract. Secondly, as 
noted above, post-signing the agreement did not provide the driv-
ers with meaningful business property in their routes that they 
could exploit as entrepreneurs.  
As a policy matter, recall that the drivers in the IC decisions 
were trying to unionize and exercise rights to statutory wages. At a 
minimum, these laws are intended to protect vulnerable workers. 
FedEx and the IC decisions’ resolution of the ambiguity between 
bargaining and producing disrupts these policy objectives. FedEx 
hired drivers without any requirements as to skill, experience, or 
capital.92 The unskilled nature of the work was evidence that the 
drivers should be classified as employees under the legal tests.93 
FedEx also dictated all of the instrumentalities of work and re-
stricted drivers’ property rights in the vehicles.94 These character-
istics of the relationship also suggested it fit well within the policy 
scope of collective bargaining and minimum wage and hour law. 
Shifting the temporal site of contract signing does not correspond 
to a transmutation of bargaining power. 
By manipulating the sequencing of the contract signing, how-
ever, rather than bargaining with an unskilled and property-less 
                                                     
92 See, e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 562, 599 (describing “minimal eligi-
bility requirements” to become a FedEx driver and ability to learn the required skills 
through FedEx’s training or supervision on the job); FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 
at 10-11 (describing process of becoming a FedEx driver). 
93 See, e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 599; FHD, 563 F.3d at 507 (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). 
94 See, e.g., Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, at *808 (Kan. 
2014); Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 597; FHD, 563 F.3d at 514 (dissent); Wells v. 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, at *13 (E.D. Mo. 2013). Drivers’ most 
valuable property rights in their vehicle ownership or leases appeared to be the ability to 
sell them, particularly to other FedEx drivers. Rather than give drivers’ autonomy over 
their market destinies, requiring drivers to purchase the vehicles tended to limit their 
ability to quit. It saddled drivers with debt payments for a truck that had little commercial 
use apart from servicing FedEx. See GREENHOUSE, supra note _; Deposition of Michael 
Callahan, Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557, 2005 WL 5865335 (No. 3:05-MD-527-
RM). Furthermore, FedEx limited drivers’ use of their vehicles for non-FedEx purposes. 
Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557. FedEx could also suspend a driver without notice, 
lock the driver’s truck in the terminal, and prevent the driver from accessing it. (N.D. 
Ind.) 
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worker, it appears that the company is bargaining with an inde-
pendent business—one that happens to possess the requisite 
equipment, skill, and knowledge. The D.C. Circuit, for example, 
did not address the skill factor at all, and it commented, “Servicing 
a route is not cheap; one needs a truck (which the contractor pays 
for) and a driver (which the contractor also pays for, either directly 
or in kind).”95 Rather than meeting as subordinate and superior on 
the factory floor, drivers seem to meet FedEx as equals at the bar-
gaining table. 96 
 
B. Negotiation or Unilateral Changes to Work Duties? 
The IC decisions also reinterpreted FedEx’s right to alter 
routes unilaterally as evidence consistent with independent entre-
preneurialism. FedEx regularly monitored delivery volumes on 
each route and reconfigured routes to even out workloads among 
drivers as deliveries expanded or contracted. This reflects the con-
tinuing and simultaneous bargaining and directing of the work that 
characterizes an employment relationship, where FedEx, as the 
stronger party, always prevails. The IC decisions exploited the am-
biguity between contracting and producing to interpret FedEx’s 
adjustments to drivers’ delivery routes as frequent re-openings of 
the negotiation process.  
The D.C. Circuit, for example, accepted FedEx’s characteriza-
tion of the company’s right to unilaterally alter routes (in return for 
some compensation) as a “Mutual Intention to Reduce the Geo-
graphic Size of Primary Service Area.”97 To keep its route in the 
case of expanding business, FedEx might require a driver to ac-
quire additional trucks and supervise other FedEx drivers. If a 
driver found this infeasible or undesirable, FedEx could change the 
driver’s route. FedEx characterized a driver’s submission to a 
mandatory route change as a driver “decid[ing] to forgo the busi-
                                                     
95 FHD, 563 F.3d at 500. 
96 The courts’ emphasis on entrepreneurial opportunity also tended to suppress the 
legal weight of the unskilled nature of the work. FedEx and Judge Miller suggested that 
entrepreneurialism was a skill. Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557 (suggesting that the 
agreement required drivers to have business management skills).  
97 FHD, 563 F.3d 492; Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 20, 22, FHD, 
563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436). 20, 22 (quoting Operating 
Agreement drivers signed). 
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ness growth opportunity”98 Note the language of equality in bar-
gaining rather than subordination in production. While it might ap-
pear that FedEx was controlling the work in determining delivery 
areas, the parties were really just reopening negotiations. If FedEx 
always managed to prevail, it was by driving a hard bargain, not 
being an employer.  
Once a court concludes that most features of the relationship 
that might suggest subordination or inequality were incidents of 
bargaining rather than production, they became irrelevant to the 
court’s decision, and even taboo, as an issue of bargaining power. 
The D.C. Circuit thus remarked, “we will ‘draw no inference of 
employment status from merely the economic controls which many 
corporations are able to exercise over independent contractors with 
whom they contract.”99 
A California Appellate Court rejected FedEx’s characterization 
of route assignments as evidence of independence in bargaining, 
noting that the terminal managers who assigned routes were “driv-
ers’ immediate supervisors and can unilaterally reconfigure the 
drivers’ routes without regard to the drivers’ resulting loss of in-
come.”100 
 
C. Termination or Aborted Negotiation? 
The authority to terminate a worker at-will is generally evi-
dence of employment rather than independent contracting under 
the legal standards for employment status.101 By default, employ-
ment in the U.S. is an at-will relationship, meaning either party 
may terminate it at any time for a good reason, a bad reason, or no 
                                                     
98 Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 22, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 
4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436).  
 
99 FHD, 563 F.3d at 502, n. 8 (citing NAVL, 869 F.2d at 599). See also, Fedex 
Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *26 (Sept. 30, 2014) (John-
son dissenting) (characterizing FedEx’s control over routes and its right to disapprove of 
an assignee to a driver’s job as a use of “contractual power” and arguing that contractual 
power is a prohibited consideration under the governing test for employment status). 
100 Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 336 (Ct. App. 
2007). At some point, FedEx modified the document signed by the Estrada drivers. The 
new document reserved FedEx’s right to unilaterally change the routes but provided a 
formula to compensate drivers who lost pay due to a reconfiguration. Kansas decision, 
734 F.Supp.2d at 574; FHD, 563 F.3d at 501.  
101 See e.g., Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 598; Borello, 769 P.2d at 404. 
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reason at all.102 Performing continuous services for a long, indefi-
nite period of time is also evidence of employment.103 Usually, in-
dependent contractors are hired to “achieve a specific result that is 
attainable within a finite period of time.”104  
The FedEx drivers signed an initial contract of one, two, or 
three years that renewed automatically. FedEx had a right to cancel 
the renewal without cause.105 The company claimed that its fixed-
term contracts drivers were evidence that the drivers were inde-
pendent contractors.106 In practice, FedEx hired drivers for long 
periods of time107 and their work—delivering packages to FedEx 
customers—continued indefinitely. FedEx also awarded vacation 
time based on driver seniority.108  
Recall that, in contractual terms, the employer and employee 
bargain over their relationship and perform it at the same time. To 
the extent employment is a contract, it is continuously renewed at 
each moment the relationship endures.109 To say that employment 
is “at-will” simply means that at some moment the employer 
and/or employee decide not to renew the contract. Maybe the em-
ployee decides not to accept the employer’s terms and conditions 
conveyed through the employer’s direction of the work. Or, per-
haps the employer feels the employee has not agreed to its terms 
by performing deficient work. Regardless of the reason, the parties 
stop bargaining.  
The ambiguity between the activities of contracting and pro-
ducing enabled the courts ruling for FedEx to interpret FedEx’s 
partial at-will authority as evidence of independent contracting. 
Judge Miller suggested that, rather than evincing a right to termi-
nate a driver, this simply showed that FedEx had a right not to en-
                                                     
102 See, e.g., Lake Land Emp. Grp. of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 2004-Ohio-786, ¶ 
17, 101 Ohio St. 3d 242, 247, 804 N.E.2d 27, 32. 
103 See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (citing 
Community for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989). 
104 Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 900 (2008). 
105 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 574, 596; FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 
2006 at 16.  
106 Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, *817 (Kan. 2014); Fed-
Ex Summary Judgment Brief at 15, Craig, 335 P.3d 66. 
107 In a California case, the average driver worked for FedEx for 8 years. Estrada v. 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 337 (Ct. App. 2007). 
108 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 25-26. 
109 See supra Part II. 
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gage in “repeat business.”110 He argued that the right to cancel a 
driver’s contract renewal without cause “isn’t atypical of an inde-
pendent contractor relationship where a hiring party can simply 
decide not to re-hire a worker.”111 The court exploited the ambi-
guity between bargaining over the work and carrying it out to in-
terpret FedEx’s partial at-will authority as evidence of the drivers’ 
contractual independence rather than subordination in produc-
tion.112  
This construction of FedEx’s authority to cancel a drivers’ con-
tract renewal also dimmed the importance of the duration of the 
relationship and the continuous nature of the service provided. 
Judge characterized this practice as one bearing on contracting ra-
ther than production, noting a company “might wish to deal with 
reliable suppliers, middlemen, or subcontractors.”113 Noting the 
drivers’ agreement was for a definite term, he found that the length 
of the relationship did not weigh in favor of either party.114 
The ambiguity between bargaining and producing in employ-
ment was behind some of the disagreement among courts trying to 
interpret the three factors discussed above with respect to FedEx 
drivers—whether the relationship was at-will, the length of the 
work relationship, and whether the services were discrete or con-
tinuous.115 One court argued, “Plaintiffs could effectively be ter-
                                                     
110 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at  595 (quoting Home Design, Inc. v. Kansas 
Dep’t of Human Res., 27 Kan.App.2d 242, 247(2000). See also State Comp. Ins. Fund v. 
Brown, 32 Cal. App. 4th 188, 203, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 98, 105 (1995), as modified (Feb. 8, 
1995) (right to terminate contract with 14 days of notice was “consistent either with an 
employment-at-will relationship or parties in a continuing contractual relationship.”) C.f. 
Taylor v. Shippers Transp. Express, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-02092 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014) 
(arguing that drayage company’s right to terminate port drivers’ 90-day, automatically 
renewable contracts on 30 days notice for any reason was equivalent to at-will authority). 
111 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 595. 
112 The D.C. Circuit cited the length of service as a relevant legal factor but ignored 
it entirely in its analysis of the drivers’ status. FHD, 563 F.3d at 496. In practice, FedEx 
had at-will authority over the drivers. See infra Part V. 
113 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596. (emphasis added). 
114 Id. 
115 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 996 (9th Cir. 2014) (ar-
guing that length of time for performance of the drivers’ work was evidence of employ-
ment); Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *19 (Sept. 30, 
2014) (arguing that length of relationship favored employment status, despite short-term 
nature of contracts); Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 335 P.3d 66, *818 (Kan. 
2014) (disagreeing with FedEx that fixed term contracts were evidence that the drivers 
were independent contractors and arguing that the length of the relationship favored em-
ployment status); Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, *1-12 
(continued next page) 
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minated at will given that the [agreement] provides for nonrenewal 
without cause.”116 Another court also argued that FedEx could 
terminate drivers by retaining the right not to renew a driver’s con-
tract without any cause and doing so in practice.117  
 
D. Performance Evaluation or Bargaining?  
Interpreting FedEx’s right to cancel a driver’s contract renewal 
as a cessation of negotiations rather than as quasi-at-will authority 
enabled to reinterpret other factors usually indicative of employ-
ment118 as consistent with independent contracting: the right to su-
pervise and discipline the worker. 
FedEx supervised drivers and evaluated every detail of their 
work. Managers inspected drivers’ vehicles and their personal 
grooming each morning and could prevent them from working or 
suspend them without notice if they did not pass inspection. The 
company monitored drivers during the day through scanning de-
vices that recorded the location and time of each package delivery. 
Drivers were also subject to occasional management ride-alongs, 
in which a manager would sit with a drivers for the day and take 
detailed notes on the work, including, for example, whether a driv-
er conveyed a “’sense of urgency,’ and ‘[p]laces [his or her] keys 
on [the] pinky finger of [his or her] non-writing hand’ after locking 
the delivery vehicle.” 119  
                                                                                                                       
(E.D. Mo. 2013) (duration of drivers’ relationship was evidence of employee status); 
Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, *10, 11 (Ct. App. 
2007). 10, 11 (citing length of relationship as evidence of employment and noting drivers 
had long-term relationship with FedEx). See also Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 
210310, 2004 WL 5631425, at *16 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 26, 2004) (drivers have long-
term relationship with FedEx).  
116 Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, *16 (E.D. Mo. 2013). 
117 Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, *1, 10, 11 (Ct. 
App. 2007). Some courts found that FedEx did not have a complete right to terminate 
drivers without cause due to an arbitration provision in the agreement. FHD NLRB Reg. 
Dir. decision 2006 at 60; Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 1033, 
1046 (9th Cir. 2014). At least two courts have struck down the provision. 
118 See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 994 (9th Cir. 
2014)  994; FHD, 563 F.3d at  498. 
119 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 
2014). FedEx instructed managers to gather detailed information, including “the time the 
driver arrives and departs from each stop, the number of minutes at each stop, the number 
of minutes between stops, the last three digits of the driver’s odometer reading at each 
stop, and the approximate distance the driver must walk to pick up or deliver a package.” 
(continued next page) 
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Drivers were subject to regular performance evaluations, and 
these formed the basis for FedEx’s decisions regarding bonuses, 
suspensions, promotions, repeated training, termination, and con-
tract renewal. FedEx referred to the meetings as “Business Discus-
sions,” part of the contracting process, not production. FedEx also 
referred to the division that reviewed drivers’ and made recom-
mendations on contract termination and nonrenewal as a “Contrac-
tor Relations” division. 120  
The IC decisions accepted FedEx’s characterization of what 
look to be employee performance evaluations with human resource 
personnel as a “Business Discussion” between an independent con-
tractor and “Contractor Liaison.” The decisions depict the perfor-
mance evaluations as forward-looking bargaining between inde-
pendent businesses, not control over production. For example, 
Judge Miller acknowledged that FedEx closely supervised the 
driver’s work and that drivers were subject to corrective measures. 
However, since he decided that FedEx did not have at-will authori-
ty over the drivers, rather than control the means of the work, he 
argued that FedEx merely gave drivers “suggestions of best prac-
tices” for drivers to follow in producing the contracted-for-service, 
or “ends” of their work.121  
Another court rejected FedEx’s attempt to refashion some of 
the institutional markers of traditional employment as markers of 
independent contracting. It also refused to interpret FedEx’s disci-
plinary authority as incidents of contracting:  
 
According to [FedEx personnel], Contractor Relations is a 
liaison between [FedEx] and [drivers] in order to guarantee 
the independent contractor model. The purpose of Contrac-
tor Relations is to review recommendations for contract 
termination or non-renewal and to make certain that termi-
nal managers do not overstep their bounds…However, a 
closer look shows that Contractor Relations is nothing more 
                                                                                                                       
Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 572 (N.D. Ind. 2010). FedEx also used customer au-
dits to review driver performance. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 12, 21.  
120 FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 12, 21; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 
at 594. A business discussion might involve a customer complaint, for which a manager 
required the driver to undergo a training course and threatened a pay penalty. In re FedEx 
Ground Package Sys., Inc., 273 F.R.D. 499 (N.D. Ind. 2010). 
121 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 594-595. 
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than a mere branch of management…Contractor Relations 
must be seen in a role akin to Human Relations over em-
ployees, wherein the highest levels of management have the 
final say.122  
 
This court viewed the role of Contractor Relations as consistent 
with an employer’s open-ended authority over production, not with 
the discrete obligations undertaken by parties to a contract.123  
 
E. Promotion or Business Expansion?  
The interpretation of what very much resemble the internal 
promotion of a driver to a supervisory position offer another ex-
ample of how the courts ruling in FedEx’s favor drew on the ten-
sion between master-servant authority and contract to reinterpret a 
feature of typical employment.  
A driver could ask FedEx to oversee multiple routes. FedEx 
had unilateral discretion over whether to grant such requests, 
which it exercised in part based on existing route coverage and 
business volume. If FedEx granted permission, the driver became 
responsible for “hiring” and supervising other FedEx drivers, and 
acquiring additional FedEx vehicles.124 FedEx limited the number 
of routes one driver could manage, and it retained unilateral au-
thority to re-configure the routes and adjust packages among 
routes, as it did with the single route drivers.125 Any driver who 
worked under the supervision of a multiple route operator had to 
first be become a FedEx driver. They had to agree to abide by all 
of the rules in written agreement with FedEx. They also had to un-
dergo the training and orientation and submit to drug testing and 
                                                     
122 Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210310, 2004 WL 5631425, at *6 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. July 26, 2004) (emphasis added). 
123 The FHD dissent also suggested that “Business Discussions” resembled employ-
ee performance evaluations, noting they could lead to discipline. FHD, 563 F.3d at 513 
(dissenting). While agreeing that FedEx did not have a “traditional” system of “repri-
mand” or “discipline,” the NLRB Regional Director in FHD likewise suggested that 
FedEx had disciplinary authority consistent with employer status. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. 
decision 2006 at 15, n.23. 
124 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596; FHD, 563 F.3d at 499; Slayman v. Fed-
Ex Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, *10 (9th Cir. 2014); Fedex Home Delivery, 361 
N.L.R.B. No. 55, 2014 WL 4926198, *10 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
125 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 573-74, 596; FHD, 563 F.3d at 501. 
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background checks. FedEx could disapprove of anyone a multiple 
route operator sought to hire.126 In essence, drivers could only 
“hire” their coworkers, with FedEx’s permission.  
The FHD majority and Judge Miller contended that driver re-
quests to serve multiple routes was evidence of the entrepreneurial 
potential for business expansion—activity in the moment of con-
tracting rather than evidence of internal job ladders in produc-
tion.127 
What looks like an internal promotion of a driver the IC decisions 
transformed into a driver successfully bargaining with FedEx to 
expand its own business. A feature of the work that ordinarily sug-
gested employer control over productive activities—organizing a 
supervisory hierarchy—became an incident of bargaining over the 
work.128 
Another court disagreed. It interpreted the company’s discre-
tionary grants of multiple routes to drivers as an activity of produc-
tion—akin to an internal promotion—rather than an activity of 
contractual negotiation by which driver-entrepreneurs expanded 
their businesses:  
 
[N]o [single-route driver] can become a[][multiple-
route driver] without the consent of [FedEx] (unless 
without the knowledge of [FedEx], a person purchases 
                                                     
126 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 994 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, at *10 (9th Cir. 2014); FHD 
NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006, at 40; Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 327, at *12 (Ct. App. 2007). See also Fedex Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 
55, 2014 WL 4926198, at *10 (Sept. 30, 2014). 
127  FHD, 563 F.3d at  499; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at  596. 
128 FHD, 563 F.3d at  499; Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 596. Similarly, FedEx 
might allow—or require—a driver to obtain an additional truck and driver. Reply Brief of 
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 21, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 2008 WL 4425828 (Nos. 07-
1391, 07-1436); Deposition of Michael Callahan at 6-7, Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 
557, 2005 WL 5865335 (No. 3:05-MD-527-RM). Again, all extra drivers had to first 
form a work relationship with FedEx and be pre-approved by FedEx. See, e.g., Kansas 
decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 562-63, 589. FedEx referred to a driver’s acquisition of addi-
tional vehicles and its agreement to oversee other FedEx drivers as a “business growth 
opportunity.” Reply Brief of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent at 21, FHD, 563 F.3d 492, 
2008 WL 4425828 (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436). The IC decisions agreed with FedEx that 
allowing or forcing a driver to hire another FedEx driver was not evidence the FedEx 
controlled the means of the work, but only evidence that FedEx contracted for certain 
“results,” and even evidence of drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunity. Kansas decision, 
734 F.Supp.2d at 588, 589; FHD, 563 F.3d at 504. 
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another [single-route driver’s] corporation that has ad-
ditional routes). A new route cannot be created without 
the approval of [FedEx]. The chance of a [single route 
driver] to become a [multiple route driver] is similar to 
that of an associate of a law firm, who has the oppor-
tunity some day to become a partner. The mere poten-
tial of that associate to become a partner does not 
transform his or her employee status to that of an inde-
pendent contractor.129 
 
The courts exploit the ambiguities resulting from the awkward 
fit of master-servant authority and contract to negate or even invert 
the legal meaning of many features of the work. Many of these fea-
tures indicate that the delivery drivers’ relationship wit FedEx is 
not passable as a contractual relationship and are relevant to the 
policy concerns of the law. 
 
IV. FROM HIERARCHY TO MARKET  
A. Markets and Hierarchies 
Theories of the firm have attempted to explain why firms exist 
as an alternative to markets for organizing production, and to ac-
count for their bordering. The question is often termed, what de-
termines whether a firm will “make” an input to production or in-
stead “buy” an input to production? Two classic firm theorists, 
Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson, defined the market in con-
tradistinction to the firm: in markets, production was organized 
through decentralized, voluntary exchanges, mediated through the 
price mechanism. In firms, production was organized through the 
command relation, a “hierarchy.”130   
Firms existed because market transactions were not costless. 
Participants to a market transaction might avoid certain costs, like 
                                                     
129 Estrada v. FedEx Ground, No. BC 210310, 2004 WL 5631425, at *15 (Cal. Su-
per. Ct. July 26, 2004). See also FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006 at 3 (multiple route 
drivers are FedEx supervisors and their “employees” are FedEx employees). 
130 Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); Oliver Wil-
liamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 
AMER. ECON. REV. 112, 114 (1971). See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES (1975). 
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that of monitoring their transacting partners. However, they often 
incurred other costs. It might take time and resources to locate 
suitable partners, determine prices, and negotiate an agreement.131 
One might be at risk to opportunistic behavior by a partner and 
face difficulty predicting and adapting to relevant contingencies.132 
Firms would exist when the costs of organizing production through 
the market exceeded the costs of organizing production through 
fiat.133  
Williamson argued that contracting costs corresponded to di-
mensions of the “transaction,” a step in the production process.134  
These dimensions were recurrence, market uncertainty, and asset 
specificity. Regarding recurrence, a firm might find it cheaper to 
make an input to production rather than repeatedly go to the mar-
ket to buy it. Uncertainty about the costs of input might also moti-
vate firm production. Asset specificity referred to the extent the 
parties were interdependent on one another because they incurred 
durable, transaction-specific investments.135  
 
B. The Firm as Employment Relationship 
Firm theories tend to associate firms and markets with different 
legal relations: market transactions were done through contract, 
while the legal authority for fiat within the firm cam from property 
rights and the employment relationship.136 Sometimes major theo-
                                                     
131 Coase, supra note _, at 386. 
132 Williamson, Governance, supra note _, at 246; Williamson, Economics, supra 
note _, at 553; WILLIAMSON, supra note _. 
133 See Williamson, Economics, supra note _, at 552-553. See generally Coase, su-
pra note _; WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). 
134 Williamson defined the “transaction” as the “transfer of a good or service over a 
technologically separable interface.” Economics, supra note _, at 552. 
135 Williamson, Governance, supra note _. 
136 See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1989): 1757–74; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES 30, 78 (1975); Williamson, Governance, supra note _, at 241-42 (suggesting 
that unenforceability of contract clause prohibiting opportunistic behavior could make the 
firm a more efficient governance structure for long-term commercial relationships); Wil-
liamson, Economics, supra note _, at 559; Benjamin, Robert Crawford, and Armen Al-
chian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Pro-
cess, 21 J.L AND ECON. 297, 302-03 (1978). Scholars often use the term “contractual” to 
refer to any kind of (usually presupposed) exchange/market relationship. See Gordon 
Smith, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, n.63 (2009) (noting that when 
scholars refer to “relational contracts,” they are often referring to non-legal dimensions of 
(continued next page) 
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rists of the firm spoke of firms and markets almost interchangeably 
with employment and contracting.137 Coase suggested, for exam-
ple, that when an entrepreneur wanted a long-term but flexible 
agreement, and did not want to work out important details ahead of 
time, the legal template of contract—which requires that parties 
specify their rights and obligations with some certainty upfront—
was unsuitable. In this case, the entrepreneur must use the em-
ployment relationship, or firm, which afforded the entrepreneur 
more open-ended authority.138 Coase’s account thus restates the 
very reason judges and treatise writers in the 19th century incorpo-
rated master-servant relations into contracts for labor services—to 
grant more discretionary control to the employer than that afforded 
by contract.139 
Also evocative of the intimate relationship between concep-
tions of the firm and employment, firm theorists have conceptual-
ized the firm as a superior governance structure for coordinating a 
complex division of labor, or multilateral relations in production. 
Alchian and Demsetz, for example, suggest that firm production 
might be desired when production involved a complex division of 
labor, making it difficult to coordinate through a contract, which 
contemplated a bilateral relationship. Make or buy decisions would 
                                                                                                                       
exchange relations). C.f. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Ian MacNeil, Contracts:  Adjustment of 
Long-Term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract 
Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1978). Many theorists of the institutional structures for 
coordinating resources in production have complicated the binary firm-market taxonomy, 
proposing new governance forms, like “network,” focusing more on informal dimensions 
of commercial relationships, and/or defining organizational forms in terms other than the 
legal relations that structure them. See, e.g., Gordon Smith, supra; OLIVER WILLIAMSON, 
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 16-18 (1985); Reinier Kraakman, The Du-
rability of the Corporate Form, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 147 (Paul DiMaggio ed. 
2001) (empahsizing the centrality of the corporate form even in networks). 
137 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market 
Failure Considerations, 61 AMER. ECON. REV. 112, 113-14 (1971). In discussing the 
putative trade-off between flexibility and calculability associated with firms and markets, 
respectively, Williamson argues that the firm offered the advantage of control (and thus 
greater calculability) through the employment relationship. See also OLIVER 
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES 78 (1975); Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _, 
at 783 (equating the capitalist “firm” with the “employer.”) See generally Bodie, supra 
note _. 
138 Coase, supra note _, at 391-392. 
139 CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 
EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 230–31, 283–84  (1993). 
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depend on how best to realize the advantages of cooperative pro-
duction—production based on the joint use of inputs.140 They re-
ject Coase’s notion that the command relation defines the firm; 
however, their analysis of how to reduce shirking and meter indi-
vidual productivity suggests that the firm is more efficient when 
most input owners contribute primarily the ability to work and not 
other assets.141 
Robert Gibbons has focused on property ownership to illustrate 
the firm-employment connection: “making” an input to production 
entails purchasing labor effort and the other supplies needed to 
make the input from separate suppliers—the supplier of labor ef-
fort (the employee) does not possess the other supplies. A “buy” 
decision means purchasing labor effort and complementary sup-
plies from a supplier who possesses both, and who has already 
combined them into a completed input for sale.142  In major eco-
nomic theories of the firm, employment largely distinguishes the 
firm from the market.143 
 
C. The Firm and the Legal Tests 
The industrial firm was the empirical model for Coase’s theory 
of the firm and the legal tests for employment status. As both bear 
its imprint, it should be unsurprising that the firm-employment 
connection is immanent in the legal tests for employment status. 
For example, under the legal tests, unskilled workers are more like-
ly to be employees than independent contractors. Hiring unskilled 
workers, particularly in an economy where labor supply exceeds 
demand, also suggests the entrepreneur is “making” a production 
input. The entrepreneur expends few resources to search the mar-
ket for no-frill labor effort. Unskilled work and the entrepreneur’s 
ownership of the tools of production also suggest a “make” deci-
                                                     
140 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); see also Bodie, supra note _, at 
39. 
141 Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _. 
142 Robert Gibbons, Firms (and Other Relationships), in THE TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 
186, 188-89 (Paul DiMaggio ed. 2001).  
143 See Matthew Bodie’s Participating as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 661 (2014). 
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sion under Gibbon’s theory: the “upstream party”—the employ-
ee—contributes effort, not effort plus assets.144 Under a transaction 
cost theory of the firm, supplying the tools of production and re-
quiring workers to undergo in-house training augur firm produc-
tion as well. These elements suggest asset specificity and high un-
certainty regarding whether the entrepreneur will find labor pos-
sessing the desired knowledge on the market. Whether the supplier 
sells its services to others, or “whether or not the one employed is 
engaged in a distinct occupation or business,”145 also measure asset 
specificity and uncertainty. Similarly, under Gibbons’ theory, an 
upstream party in a market with one buyer is an employee. Like-
wise, under Coase and Williamson’s theory, firms would be ex-
pected to incur costs in ex post monitoring and sanctions in organ-
izing production, but expect the entrepreneur who is contracting 
with independent suppliers to incur more of its costs in ex ante ne-
gotiations. Consistent with this expectation, supervision of the 
work and a right to discipline the worker are evidence of employ-
ment under the legal tests. The extent to which the work is part of 
the alleged employer’s “regular business” more explicitly asks 
whether the worker is part of a firm, and therefore more likely an 
employee.146  
 
D. Destabilizing the Firm: The FedEx Enterprise as “Market” 
Due to the close relationship between socio-legal conceptions 
of the firm and employment, the tension between master-servant 
authority and contract within employment tends to destabilize the 
conventional boundary between firms and markets. As conceived 
by major theories of the firm, contractual relations in the market 
tend to be direct, bilateral, discrete, and putatively equal. Likewise, 
relations of production within a firm tend to be hierarchical, multi-
lateral, and indefinite. The tension between bargaining and produc-
ing in employment reappears as a tension within the firm: em-
ployment as a contract is direct and bilateral, but employment is 
                                                     
144 Gibbons, supra note _. 
145 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). 
146 Id. 
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also the legal rationale for the firm’s centralized control over indi-
rect and multilateral relations in production.147  
 
1. Transforming FedEx into a Market   
 Within the terms of major firm theories, like those of Coase, 
Williamson, Gibbons, and Alchian and Demsetz, FedEx is clearly 
making delivery services, not going to the market to buy them.   
FedEx does not incur costs in searching the market for contrac-
tors with certain skills, experience, and equipment.148 It hires un-
skilled workers, who furnish no specialized assets, through a 
standardized application.149 Likewise, FedEx does not incur costs 
in negotiating or drafting a contract, given drivers sign a standard-
ized, non-negotiable agreement. The required training and FedEx’s 
provision of the tools of work also reflect asset specificity. By hir-
ing unskilled workers and training them, FedEx minimized the risk 
that the experience and skill required for the job might be unavail-
able on the market, particularly given that FedEx was the only 
buyer. Instead, FedEx incurred costs in training, monitoring, and 
disciplining workers.  
FedEx’s control over delivery routes and daily workloads—its 
control over the initial route assignment, its monitoring of business 
volume, its frequent adjustment of route and package assign-
ments—reveals a firm directing resources through fiat as it deter-
mines an efficient division of labor.150 The price mechanism is not 
determining the drivers’ business volume. The route assignment 
also suggests firm production due to its high asset specificity from 
the driver’s perspective. To receive a route, the driver must first 
make costly, “durable, transaction-specific investments,”151 or in-
                                                     
147 See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _, at 794 (firm production involves “central 
common party to a set of bilateral contracts,” which “facilitates efficient organization of 
the joint inputs”). 
148 See Coase, supra note _. 
149 Under Gibbons’ theory, FedEx is purchasing labor alone from the drivers, not la-
bor plus assets. FedEx is the only buyer on the market for these services, and the drivers 
sell only to FedEx. They do not own and control assets useful in the production of other 
goods or services. Gibbons, supra note _, 
150 See Coase, supra note _; Alchian and Demsetz, supra note _. 
151 See Williamson, Economics, supra note _. 
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vest in resources, like a FedEx vehicle and training, that are diffi-
cult to redeploy to other uses.152  
Nor did FedEx expose itself to uncertainty as to the price it 
supposedly pays for its delivery services: FedEx pre-determined its 
labor costs. Similarly, the company absorbed most of the risk of 
cost increases in non-labor inputs to production. While it external-
ized some production costs onto drivers, like fuel and vehicle 
maintenance, FedEx also assisted drivers with these costs. Further, 
FedEx realized economies of scale, for instance, in purchasing in-
surance for drivers. In sum, FedEx did not go to the market, re-
peatedly, to acquire the same service—a service for which it is the 
only buyer—from thousands of different independent suppliers. 
Regarding the proposed trade-off the firm offered between flexibil-
ity and calculability, FedEx left nothing to chance.  
 However, the contradiction between master-servant authority 
and contract enabled FedEx and the courts to transform a firm, as 
conceived by major economic theories of the firm, into a market. 
The IC decisions masked “make” decisions—FedEx’s purchase of 
labor effort—as “buy” decisions—FedEx’s purchase of labor, la-
bor effort absorbed and transmuted into a completed service. Thus, 
the IC decisions reinterpret performance evaluations and discipli-
nary action against the drivers as contractual negotiations between 
the drivers and FedEx. Supervision and ex post correction, charac-
teristic of a firm transaction, become the activities of ex ante in-
formation gathering and negotiation, indicative of a market trans-
action.153 Judge Miller, following FedEx’s cues, suggested training 
drivers was a cost to FedEx of transacting on the market—a “buy” 
decision. It was a “precondition” to contracting, an asset drivers 
brought with them to the bargaining table. In interpreting FedEx’s 
cancellation of a driver’s otherwise automatic contract renewal as 
an aborted negotiation rather than an employee termination, the IC 
decisions also depicted what resembled a firm under economic 
                                                     
152 Drivers were not allowed to use their trucks for other commercial purposes dur-
ing the 45-55 hours they were dedicated to FedEx. Outside of these hours, drivers could 
use the trucks for other purposes so long as they removed or covered all FedEx markings. 
FHD, 563 F.3d 492.  
153 The drivers’ pay formula also suggested they produced delivery services in a 
firm, not a market. The formula was based primarily on the time drivers committed to 
FedEx, not by project. It included seniority bonuses. FedEx also paid bonuses based on 
the collective performance of workers at a terminal. Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d 557.  
8/12/2015] From Hierarchies to Markets 49 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
theory as a market. A decision to cancel a driver’s automatic con-
tract renewal became an ex ante decision not to contract in the 
market, a decision not to engage in, “repeat business.”154 Returning 
the example regarding the driver promotions to oversee more than 
one route, FedEx, not the price mechanism, is directing resources 
in production. The drivers’ so-called “business expansion,” looks 
very much like a firm’s promotion of a driver up the internal job 
ladder. FedEx is coordinating hierarchical relations in production. 
FedEx and the IC decisions, however, suggested the decentralized 
market conferred the opportunity, rather than FedEx.  
 
 2. Shift Replacements or Entrepreneurialism? 
FedEx and the IC decisions engaged the ambiguity between 
contracting and producing not only to redefine relations between 
FedEx and each driver, but also to redefine relations among driv-
ers. In doing so, it dissolved the FedEx bureaucracy into a nexus of 
contracts. Multilateral cooperation among coworkers in production 
merged into bilateral relations between contracting parties in the 
market.  
FedEx and the courts ruling in its favor argued that the drivers 
were entrepreneurs, because they could “hire” others to perform 
their work for them. Drivers could take advantage of expanding 
business volume on their routes by hiring multiple drivers or de-
cide not to work at all. The courts and FedEx contended the latter 
was “not involved” in any of these transactions between one driver 
and another.155 However, any replacement and extra drivers must 
already have formed a work relationship with FedEx: they must 
undergo the required orientation, drug screening, road test, and 
agree to follow all the rules in the written agreement. Moreover, 
FedEx could still disapprove of anyone a driver wanted to hire.156 
In other words, drivers could “hire” their coworkers.  
Unsurprisingly, drivers usually used replacements when they 
needed a day off for illness or another reason. Or, they rented an 
extra truck and used one of FedEx’s temporary drivers during the 
                                                     
154  Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 595 (quoting Home Design, Inc. v. Kansas 
Dep’t of Human Res., 27 Kan.App.2d 242, 247(2000). 
155  
156  
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holiday season, when they needed the help to complete their as-
signed deliveries. This looks very much like having a coworker 
cover a shift for you, or getting a coworker to help you with your 
assigned work. However, the courts ruling for FedEx reinterpreted 
the company’s centralized control over a complex division of labor 
in production as the drivers bargaining with one another in the 
market.157 Multilateral cooperation among drivers, as they worked 
under FedEx’s supervision and control, became bilateral contracts 
between drivers in a decentralized market. Producing became con-
tracting, and the fiat of the entrepreneur became the price mecha-
nism. 
Through the interpretation of shift replacements as incidents of 
contracting rather than producing, the MDL court also negated an-
other factor probative of employment under the applicable legal 
test: the extent of the putative employer’s control over the worker’s 
schedule. Judge Miller acknowledged that FedEx tightly controlled 
drivers’ schedules. Drivers had to arrive within a certain window 
in the morning—after the packages became available but early 
enough to complete the 9.5-11 hours of work FedEx assigned per 
day. They had to complete deliveries by a certain time in the even-
ing and meet windows negotiated by FedEx for certain customers. 
Judge Miller argued, however, “Contractors’ ability to hire assis-
tants and replacement drivers, though, even under FedEx’s approv-
al requirements, allows them to have complete freedom in their 
schedules.”158 
 
 3. From Firm to Market, From Bureaucracy to Nexus of Con-
tracts 
 In fact, Judge Miller took the interpretation of shift replace-
ments as an incidence of bargaining in the market rather than pro-
ducing within a firm to a nonsensical extreme. The judge argued 
that FedEx indeed controlled and monitored virtually every detail 
of the drivers’ work, from their schedules to their appearance to 
how they drove, kept records, handled packages, and interacted 
with customers. He noted that all of this normally would be evi-
dence of employment under the governing legal test. But, he ar-
                                                     
157  
158 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 591 (emphasis added).  
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gued that here, it was not, because the drivers were not “personal-
ly” subject to any of these controls: FedEx controlled the positions 
but not the drivers.159  
 This is the very definition of bureaucracy. The FedEx enter-
prise resembled not just any firm as might be faintly adumbrated 
by economic theory: it resembled the consummate firm—a bureau-
cracy as conceptualized by Max Weber.160 The more the alloca-
tion, pacing, and direction of the work, as well as the skill and 
knowledge of the work, is embedded in the machine161 —here the 
FedEx logistics system, and the more closely it’s monitored, the 
more indifferent the firm becomes to whether it’s Mary or Lee sit-
ting in the delivery truck. The drivers are interchangeable. But this 
separation of the person from the position reveals a bureaucracy—
the consummate expression of a firm. 162  
 Another dimension of the tension between master-servant sta-
tus relations and contract comes to the fore here: As a master-
servant relationship, employment is personal. As a contract, it is 
impersonal and presumably assignable. Here the court construes 
the fungibility of drivers as evidence that the relationship is imper-
sonal—the kind of arms-length relationship found in the market. 
The drivers’ interchangeability among standardized routines in a 
tightly integrated operation becomes evidence of FedEx’s lack of 
control over their work.163 
 This exploitation of the tension between master-servant au-
thority and contract not only redefines a firm as a market, but 
thwarts the policy purposes of collective bargaining and minimum 
wage law: The impersonality of bureaucracy—its indifference to 
the personal characteristics of those filling its slots—was possible 
precisely because the drivers were interchangeable, low-skilled 
workers. The very evidence that suggested their status as workers 
with little bargaining power—workers within the contemplated 
                                                     
159 Id. at 596. 
160 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 988 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1922). 
161 Id. at 1395. 
162 Id. at 218-19.  
163 Another dimension of the tension between master-servant status relations and 
contract comes to the fore here: As a master-servant relationship, employment is person-
al. As a contract, it is impersonal and presumably assignable. Here the court construes the 
fungibility of drivers as evidence that the relationship is impersonal—the kind of arms-
length relationship found in the market. 
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scope of the NLRA and minimum wage and hour law—became 
evidence of independent contracting. The drivers’ fungibility, their 
disposability, became evidence of their autonomy. The more that 
drivers were “small cog[s] in a ceaselessly moving mechanism 
which prescribes…an essentially fixed route of march,”164 the 
more they looked like entrepreneurs. 165 
  
Judge Miller’s association of driver autonomy with FedEx’s 
purported indifference to who drove its trucks is belied also by 
FedEx’s bodily inspection of drivers. Drivers had to submit to 
physical invasions not associated with civilian independent con-
tracting—periodic drug screenings and physical examinations, and 
for some drivers, strength tests. These criteria for the job, as well 
as the driving record and criminal background check, could not be 
assigned from one body to another.  
The IC decisions evoke Weber’s comment about capitalist 
work:  
 
The private enterprise system transforms into objects of ‘labor 
market transactions’ even those personal and authoritarian-
hierarchical relations which actually exist in the capitalist en-
terprise. While the authoritarian relationships are thus drained 
of all normal sentimental content, authoritarian constraint not 
only continues but, at least under certain circumstances, even 
increases.166  
                                                     
164 Id. 
165 Unsurprisingly, the case records reveal few scant instances where drivers availed 
themselves of the fabled entrepreneurial opportunity. In FHD, only one driver—a multi-
ple-route driver—used his truck for a commercial purpose apart from serving FedEx. 
Three out of thirty-three drivers held multiple-routes, and two of these drivers relied on 
spouses to help with delivery volume. Not a single driver hired a full-time substitute. 
Drivers used substitute drivers only for illness or vacation. Further they usually selected 
substitute and extra drivers from a pool of replacement drivers FedEx made available for 
that purpose.  
The MDL record indicated that drivers rarely hired full-time substitutes or supple-
mental drivers. Shift replacements appeared to cost drivers money rather than increase 
their earnings. See Greenhouse, supra note _. It is unclear the extent to which drivers at 
other terminals created independent businesses, but evidence is sparse. Foust 2005; 
Wishnia 2012; Grella 2009; Greenhouse, supra note _. 
Regardless, the IC decisions are unable to explain why these opportunities are “en-
trepreneurial,” and not those available to a resourceful and smart employee. 
166 WEBER, supra note _, at 731. 
8/12/2015] From Hierarchies to Markets 53 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
 
The courts conflate the depersonalization of bureaucratic dom-
ination with the purported impersonality and autonomy of the mar-
ket.  
 
 4. The Legitimacy of the Firm 
 Classic theories of the firm have not always explained firm 
boundaries very well.167 Financialization, globalization, technolog-
ical advances, and other economic changes often uncouple govern-
ance types from their theorized costs and advantages. The theories 
have not provided a refutable explanation for today’s buyer-driven 
supply chains, for example.168 These tend to centralize decision-
making across firms. Other forms of production decentralize deci-
sion-making within firms. Classic theories of the firm tend to share 
the major flaw of assuming that the boundaries of the business 
form will coincide with the boundaries of the productive enter-
prise. The FedEx cases present another counterexample.  
Nonetheless, in trying to provide an account for the firm’s ex-
istence, theories of the firm also, implicitly, provide a legitimating 
account of the firm as a business form. Classic theories of the firm, 
like those expostulated by Coase and Williamson, ground the so-
cial legitimacy of the corporation in the production of goods and 
services: The warrant for the corporation is its ongoing coordina-
tion of a productive enterprise. In this regard, classic theories of 
the firm stand in counterpoise to theories that promote the corpora-
                                                     
167 For instance, Williamson’s theory that differences between contracting and agen-
cy costs could explain make or buy decisions did not explain mergers and acquisitions in 
the 1980s. Charles Perrow, Economic Theories of Organization, 15 THEORY & SOC’Y 11 
(1986).  
168 Non-property relations do not necessarily impose greater information costs than 
firms today. Communications and logistics technology have improved information flow 
across proprietary firm boundaries. Advanced technology also helps to reduce the meter-
ing of individual productivity across property lines in buyer-driven supply chains. Fur-
ther, market position enables powerful buyer-firms to avoid the trade-off between control 
and the risk of decreases in product demand. Wal-Mart controls suppliers via its monop-
sony position. The company wants a flexible relationship with supplier firms akin to at-
will employment. It uses market power rather than property ownership and employment 
to achieve this control. By de-integrating or refusing to integrate, large downstream firms 
can avoid liability, public scrutiny, and do not have to buy or maintain costly plant and 
equipment. See also Mark Granovetter. Economic Action and Social Structure: The Prob-
lem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. OF SOC. 481 (1985). 
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tion as a “nexus of contracts,” a “bundle of assets,” or a tool for 
financial speculation, accounting manipulation, and regulatory 
evasion.169 As FedEx and the courts redefine the distinction be-
tween firms and markets, they redefine the appropriate relationship 
between the corporate form and the productive enterprise.170 
In trying to explain the existence of firms, theories of the firm 
implicitly provide a legitimating account of the business form. 
Classic theories of the firm, like those expostulated by Coase and 
Williamson, grounded the social legitimacy of the corporation in 
the efficient production of goods and services. In redefining the 
FedEx work relationship as market production rather than firm 
production, the IC decisions reject this conception. They find com-
pany with those promoting the corporation as a tool for financial 
speculation, accounting manipulation, and regulatory evasion. 
 
 5. Technology and Service Work 
Advances in technology and distinctions between service work 
and industrial manufacturing are two sources of institutional dis-
ruption in contemporary work relations. This section hypothesizes 
that these contributed to making salient the ambiguity between 
bargaining and producing in the FedEx disputes.  
The FedEx bureaucracy is relatively invisible compared to the 
bureaucracy of an industrial manufacturing enterprise. The ad-
vanced logistics and communications technology that FedEx uses 
replaces the heavy integrated machinery and constant eye of the 
                                                     
169 Paul DiMaggio, Introduction: Making Sense of the Contemporary Firm and Pre-
figuring Its Future, in THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC 
ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2011). GERALD F. 
DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RESHAPED AMERICA (2009). Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Scholars generally use 
“nexus of contracts” as a theory of firm ownership and control, a hypothesis about rela-
tionships among owners, financiers, and management, rather than relationships among 
workers and management. Id. The article suggests, however, that the IC decisions offer a 
nexus of contracts theory of the firm based on relationships between workers and man-
agement. 
170 See e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). See also ROY, supra note _ (refuting Chan-
dler’s efficiency theory as explanation for rise of large, integrated firms in the United 
States); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
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foreman typical of industrial manufacturing. FedEx organizes, di-
rects, and paces the work largely through the former. For instance, 
barcode technology enables FedEx to monitor drivers’ locations 
and delivery times. The control is relatively invisible.  
Distinctions between industrial manufacturing and service 
work may also have played a role. The production of FedEx deliv-
ery services takes place not in a factory, and not only in FedEx 
terminals, but along thousands of miles of roads, and in the door-
ways of millions of residences and businesses. Production and con-
sumption occur simultaneously in service work (i.e., the delivery 
driver produces the service as the costumer consumes it).  
FedEx did not accomplish its direction of resources through 
gears and conveyer belts in a factory. It accomplished its fiat, its 
centralized control over a multilateral division of labor in produc-
tion, through logistics and communications technology, and over 
an enormous geographic space not dedicated to FedEx production 
alone. To the IC courts, the FedEx bureaucracy appeared as a nex-
us of bilateral contracts among drivers in a sprawling market.  
It is unlikely that any court would find that pre-specifying and 
embedding the work process in machinery is evidence of inde-
pendent contracting—evidence that the alleged employer is not 
controlling the means of the work. However, the IC decisions, par-
ticularly Judge Miller, fail to appreciate the logistics machine of 
FedEx. FedEx’s control over drivers through sophisticated tech-
nology appeared as freedom.  
 
 6. Institutional Work: Contract as Bilateral, Direct, and Exclu-
sive  
 To flatten the FedEx bureaucracy into a “nexus of con-
tracts,”171 the IC decisions perform institutional work. In particu-
lar, the decisions invoked an institutional features associated with 
contract relations: the contract as a bilateral, direct, and exclusive 
relationship. For instance the FHD majority emphasized that Fed-
Ex was not involved in the relationship between drivers and substi-
tutes, extra drivers, and helpers: “[C]ontractors have the ability to 
                                                     
171 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 
26 J. L. & ECON.  301 (1983); DAVIS, supra note _.  
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hire others without FedEx’s participation,”172 and “substitutes and 
helpers have been hired without FedEx’s involvement.”173 The IC 
decisions also characterized the promoted driver’s supervision of 
other FedEx drivers as a distinct employment relationship in which 
FedEx was uninvolved.  
By emphasizing the contract as direct, bilateral, and exclusive, 
the courts transformed multilateral relations among coworkers in 
the productive process into bilateral contracts in the market. The 
work of FedEx drivers is deeply embedded in a logistics system 
and managerial hierarchy as imperious as the assembly line of an 
industrial firm. However, by constructing the relationships among 
drivers as contractual relations that excluded FedEx, the decisions 
seem to make the FedEx logistics machine and bureaucracy disap-
pear. In rendering the integrated enterprise of FedEx largely invisi-
ble, this institutional work created the illusion of independent busi-
ness activity among drivers.174  
 
V. CONTRACTUAL ENDS OR THE MANNER OF PERFORMANCE? 
This section examines how the IC decisions dealt with the sec-
ond interpretative ambiguity in the employment contract identified 
in Part II—the ambiguity between contractual duties and the way 
they are performed. It shows that this ambiguity, like the ambiguity 
between the activities of bargaining and producing, created discord 
among courts considering the employment status of FedEx drivers. 
It also shows another way in which the IC decisions constructed 
the written contract as a marker of non-employment,175 apart from 
                                                     
172 FHD, 563 F.3d at 502. 
173 Id. at 503. 
174 A driver’s permission to sell a route to another FedEx driver provided opportuni-
ty to profit, albeit in a one-time sell, for a few drivers. In the FedEx Home Delivery dis-
pute, most new drivers received routes for free from FedEx, limiting the emergence of a 
viable secondary market in FedEx jobs. FHD NLRB Reg. Dir. decision 2006. Most who 
quit their positions at FedEx did not sell their routes, and terminated drivers were not 
allowed to sell them. Id. There is no evidence in any of the case records that any FedEx 
driver created a business model out of trading FedEx jobs. It is also unclear why permis-
sion to sell one’s job is evidence that the position affords entrepreneurial opportunity. 
175 For a more detailed discussion of how this ambiguity engenders inconsistency in 
legal disputes over employment status, see Julia Tomassetti, The Contracting/Producing 
Ambiguity and the Collapse of the Means/ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. 
Rev. 315 (2014). 
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positioning it as a temporal barrier between bargaining and produc-
ing.  
As explained in Part II, the law’s attempt to assimilate master-
servant relations to contract produced a peculiar kind of contract in 
employment. Unlike other contracts, the employment contract gave 
one party a right to determine how the other party performed its 
contractual duties. The means-ends standard for employment status 
thus asks whether one party has a right to determine not only the 
contracted-for ends of the deal, but also the “means” of performing 
them. Parties may flex their muscles to insist that their contract in-
clude certain obligations. Yet neither has a right to control how the 
other performs those obligations. Distinguishing employment from 
independent contracting therefore depends on being able to distin-
guish between contractual duties and the manner of their perfor-
mance, in order to evaluate whether one party is controlling the 
latter, or just the former. As explained in Part II, the problem is 
that the fusion of master-servant authority with contract makes the 
distinction between contractual duties and how they are performed. 
The employment contract collapses contractual formation and per-
formance. The employer and employee do not consummate a con-
tractual bargain and then proceed to perform it.  
This conundrum puts the written agreement in an ambiguous 
position in employment status disputes. It permits two possible in-
terpretations: (1) Does anything stated in a written agreement nec-
essarily refer to a contractual obligation and not the manner of sat-
isfying it? Therefore, if the alleged employer is not telling workers 
to do anything that is not in the contract, is it not controlling the 
work? Likewise, if the alleged employer is closely supervises the 
work, but only to ensure workers conform to contractual specifica-
tions, is it not controlling the work? (2) By contrast, are some 
things stated in the contract not really contractual duties—do they 
actually give one party has a right to determine how the other per-
forms contractual duties or collapse the distinction?  
The IC decisions take the first approach with respect to the 
Operating Agreement (OA) drivers signed with FedEx. Judge Mil-
ler and the D.C. Circuit find that anything stated in the written con-
tract was a contractual duty, by virtue of its expression there. The 
written contract could not give one party has a right to control how 
the other performs a contractual duty. Therefore, because FedEx 
was not supervising and directing the work in any way that was 
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inconsistent with or extraneous to the written contract, it was not 
their employer: it was not telling the drivers how to perform their 
contractual obligations, because these were the contractual obliga-
tions. The long, detailed OA (over seventy pages) purportedly ex-
hausted FedEx’s authority over drivers and described their rela-
tionship ex ante with reasonable certainty. The document drivers 
signed became an institutional marker of non-employment: it 
formed a firewall between producing and contracting, protecting 
the latter from contaminating the former, as it does in employment.  
For example, Judge Miller repeatedly implied that the exten-
sive elaboration of work in the OA established the precise bounds 
of FedEx’s authority, and its lack of interest in controlling the 
work during production.176 He acknowledges that “[v]arious provi-
sions of the Operating Agreement authorize FedEx to control the 
days of service, the contractor’s daily workload, and certain time 
windows when pick-ups and deliveries must be made. These re-
quirements weigh in favor of employee status….” He continues, 
however, by arguing that these requirements “are more suggestive 
of a results-oriented approach to management when viewed with 
the totality of circumstances. FedEx has contracted for the perfor-
mance of certain work and has the right to require that the work be 
completed as agreed.”177  
Both Judge Miller and the D.C. Circuit suggested that any su-
pervision of the drivers to ensure that they were complying with 
specifications in the OA could not be evidence of employment: the 
company was not exercising extra-contractual discretion. FHD also 
interpreted the five-day workweek of industrial employment as 
more consistent with independent contracting than employment. It 
argued that FedEx did not control the means of the work, since “it 
is undisputed the contractors are only obligated to provide service 
five days a week.”178 Judge Miller also characterized features of 
the work typical of industrial employment as contractual undertak-
ings by FedEx. Thus, required training was not weighty evidence 
of employment status, because the written agreement required 
FedEx to “familiarize” drivers with the service they would pro-
                                                     
176 See also supra Part IV.D. 
177 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 589. 
178 FHD, 563 F.3d at 499 (emphasis added). 
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vide.179 Also, with respect to assigning drivers 9-11 hours of work 
per day, five days a week, “FedEx is required to fulfill this obliga-
tion pursuant to the parties’ agreement, so it isn’t necessarily in-
dicative of employee status.”180  
Likewise, the DC Circuit suggested that many work rules pre-
specified in the OA were not in this instance evidence of employ-
ment, because they were contractual obligations that described the 
service the drivers agreed to provide. The court acknowledged that 
in other delivery driver cases, including prior cases involving Fed-
Ex drivers, judges found certain features of work relevant to the 
question of employment status—rules regarding training, insur-
ance, uniforms, grooming standards, vehicles, performance bonus-
es, the inability to turn down assignments, and the five-day work-
week. The majority argued that, in this case, however, “those dis-
tinctions, though not irrelevant, reflect differences in the type of 
service the contractors are providing rather than differences in the 
employment relationship.”181 
The most extreme example of using the ambiguity between 
contractual duties and their performance to negate evidence of em-
ployment under the legal tests involved Judge Miller’s interpreta-
tion of the drivers’ right to quit in the written contract. The judge 
noted that FedEx assigned each driver 9-11 hours of package de-
liveries per day, and that drivers had to delivery every package as-
signed to them that day. He acknowledged, “Requiring workers to 
accept assigned work weighs in favor of employee status.”182 
However, he claimed, “contractors can terminate their contracts 
upon thirty days’ notice, in which case, they would be relieved of 
any future work assignments.” The right to quit is evidence that the 
drivers are employees under the governing legal tests. By default, 
an employee can quit without incurring contractual liability. Be-
cause the OA states the driver’s at-will right, however (modified 
only with a notice requirement), the court interprets it to negate not 
only this evidence of employment status, but also the evidence that 
FedEx has a right to assign daily workloads. 
                                                     
179 Wells v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 979 F.Supp.2d 1006, at *6 (E.D. Mo. 
2013) (citing Operating Agreement drivers signed).  
180 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 590. 
181 FHD, 563 F.3d at 501.  
182 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 590. 
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Other courts considering the employment status of FedEx driv-
ers differed in resolving the ambiguity between contractual duties 
and their manner of performance. The 9th Circuit, for example, 
found that the OA was not limited to stating only the results of the 
work, but that the agreement gave FedEx the (non-contract-like) 
right to control the drivers’ work.183 
From a doctrinal perspective grounded in the distinction be-
tween a contract and a master-servant relationship, the IC decisions 
are incorrect in their interpretation of the written document drivers 
signed. The OA does not specify the essential details of the bargain 
or limit the discretion of FedEx production. It reads much like a 
master-servant relationship. Some of its provisions nearly recite 
the legal definition of employment. For example, drivers agree to 
follow supervisory instructions (“cooperate with” FedEx employ-
ees). Some expressly give FedEx a right to determine the terms and 
conditions of work during the course of the work. For instance, 
drivers agree to follow whatever appearance and grooming stand-
ards FedEx might promulgate from “time to time,” and to service a 
route as changed by FedEx from “time to time.” Some provisions 
contemplate that FedEx will exercise ongoing discretion in its di-
rection and supervision of the work. For example, drivers must 
complete work assigned daily.  
Some of the contractual terms the IC decisions cite as evidence 
of the drivers’ entrepreneurial opportunity are actually evidence of 
employment. Take the example of route assignments and daily as-
signed work. FedEx and the IC decisions contend that route as-
signments are evidence of entrepreneurial opportunity, because 
drivers could negotiate for a good route and had contracted-for 
property rights in their routes. Yet, FedEx did not commit contrac-
tually to a route assignment, however. It reserved the right to 
change a driver’s service area unilaterally, upon a few days of no-
tice.184 Further, drivers agree to deliver packages outside their ser-
vice areas and to relinquish deliveries in their service areas to other 
drivers “as requested” by management. Drivers agreed to perform 
                                                     
183 Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“What matters is what the contract, in actual effect, allows or requires”) (emphasis add-
ed). See also Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
184 See, e.g., Coase, supra note _, at _ (entrepreneur’s preference for avoiding ex 
ante specification of significant details of the relationship favors firm production). 
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whatever work FedEx required each day. Judge Miller admitted as 
much, noting, “FedEx drivers typically are required to flex pack-
ages. Flexing is the daily expansion or contraction of a drivers’ 
work area.”185 He likewise acknowledged that payment was based 
on “expected daily work hours,”186 and that FedEx had authority to 
determine the days drivers must work.187 
All of these contractual “ends” leave it up to FedEx to deter-
mine the quantity of work the drivers will actually provide and 
what they will earn for it. The terms reveal that the negotiation 
process regarding the drivers’ services does not end upon signing 
the agreement. The drivers and FedEx never arrive at an agreement 
regarding the essential terms of a contractual bargain.  
The contract did not limit FedEx’s discretion; it simply deemed 
every exercise of discretion resembling the traditional prerogatives 
of an employer as consistent with the contract and an exercise of 
contract enforcement. While FedEx claimed that it could terminate 
a contract only upon a driver’s breach, it reserved the authority to 
interpret whether drivers’ satisfactorily complied with the agree-
ment.188  
Many of the work rules the drivers contracted to follow re-
quired interpretation and implementation by supervisors. The 
“Standard of Service” the drivers agree to provide—the supposed 
“ends” of the work—is stated in broad terms that managers must 
fill out during the course of the work. To do so, managers used 
think manuals full of detailed policies that were generally unavail-
able to drivers. Managers also had discretion regarding what al-
leged breaches of the OA to document in drivers’ files. Drivers had 
recourse to arbitration only after termination. While the OA re-
quired FedEx to give notice before terminating a driver, it could 
suspend a driver without notice.189  
                                                     
185 Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 569. 
186 Id. at 568. 
187 Id. See also id. at 589 (“Various provisions of the Operating Agreement authorize 
FedEx to control the days of service, the contractor's daily workload, and certain time 
windows when pick-ups and deliveries must be made.”) 
188 Estrada at 334. 
189 In one decision, Judge Miller cited nine instances where Michigan terminal man-
agers threatened to refuse bonus payments or terminate drivers for rule violations. In re 
FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 273 F.R.D. 499 (N.D. Ind. 2010). 
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Another court ruling on the drivers’ employment status recog-
nized the quantum dimension of the drivers’ supposed contractual 
duties, arguing that the “right to interpret the OA and the other 
matters is in the sole hands of [FedEx]. By leaving such subjective 
interpretation to the discretion of management, the relationship be-
tween the [drivers] and [FedEx] ceases to be a partnership, meta-
morphasizing into a tightly controlled hierarchical employment 
model.”190 In sum, the “OA is a brilliantly drafted contract creating 
the constraints of an employment relationship with [single-route 
drivers] in the guise of an independent contractor model.”191 
Where the IC decisions saw a congeries of equal parties in the 
market, this court saw a model of rational bureaucracy: 
 
[The] lack of objective, precisely defined guidelines either re-
flects a totally disorganized business, which [FedEx] is certain-
ly not, or a highly motivated, well organized entity, which it is, 
that utilizes control and order in order to meet its successful 
economic goals.192 
 
We think of contracts as delineating discrete obligations be-
tween two parties.193 The FedEx contract, however, appears to de-
scribe the enterprise organization. The contract pre-specifies the 
work a little like an engineering blueprint. Its work directives de-
posit the drivers into a highly rationalized, tightly integrated pro-
ductive process controlled from the top. 194  
                                                     
190  Estrada trial ct. 2004, at *5. 
191  Id. at *3. 
192 Id. at *6. The Kansas Supreme Court and 9th Circuit also interpret the signifi-
cance of these contractual provisions in the opposite manner of the IC decisions. They 
suggest that an employer cannot transform the means of work into the ends of work 
merely by stating so in its contract.  
193 See Judy Fudge, Fragmenting Work and Fragmenting Organizations: The Con-
tract of Employment and the Scope of Labour Regulation, 44 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 609 
(2006); Judy Fudge, The Legal Boundaries of the Employer, Precarious Workers, and 
Labour Protection, in BOUNDARIES AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS 
IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 295 (Guy Davidov and Brian Langille eds., 2006); see also 
FREEDLAND, supra note _, at 36-52. 
194 Even if many rules in the contract provide meaningful guidance, some courts still 
resist interpreting everything in the contract as a description of the ends of the work. 
Courts have been unwilling to construe rules involving uniforms, grooming, demeanor, 
and work schedules as consistent with independent contracting. See, e.g., Alexander. 
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The following thought experiment seeks to illustrate how the 
interpretative ambiguities in employment make it possible for 
judges to reinterpret even traditional employment as independent 
contracting.195 It is also meant to illustrate the potential role of 
technology and service work in shaping the IC decisions—they 
make it easier to disguise the FedEx bureaucracy as a nexus of 
contracts in the market. Finally, the though experiment is meant to 
reveal how distant the image of the firm constructed in the IC deci-
sions is from the firm as conceptualized by classic theories of the 
firm: 
 
• You contract with the firm for a “proprietary right” to your 
assembly line workstation. You are responsible for rotating 
and inserting pins inside each widget that comes down the 
conveyor belt in a day. You have no set schedule, but the 
firm turns on machine at 7:30 am so you cannot begin be-
fore that. You can take breaks when you want, but the en-
gineers control the speed of the machinery, and they have 
estimated how long it takes you to grab the widget, turn 
your wrist, pick up a pin, and insert it, and thus you will 
have 9.5-11 hours of work per day. You must work so as 
not to hold up the next station. We turn the machine off at 
5:30 pm.  
• You have entrepreneurial opportunity: You receive pay-
ment per each widget and pin, and depending on our cus-
tomer demand, the machine will speed up and send more 
pins down per day. If it looks like you are falling behind, 
we will give some of your work to a coworker or install an 
automated widget rotator that will decrease your pay. But, 
we give you five days to present a plan to us showing how 
you can take advantage of this increased “business volume” 
by finding a coworker to help hand you the pins or purchas-
ing an expensive widget rotator.  
• You also “invest” in your business/workstation, because 
you are responsible for paying for the oil to keep that part 
of the conveyor belt moving. As long as all these imple-
ments meet the particular specifications we set, you can 
                                                     
195 I thank Larry Solum and Noah Zatz for suggesting this thought experiment. 
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buy them anywhere. Thus, you have the entrepreneurial 
opportunity to earn “profit” by finding cheap suppliers.196  
• You can “hire” others to run your station, so long as they 
are coworkers or workers who we have already agreed to 
hire. You can expand your business if we allow you to 
manage a group of stations and hire coworkers to run them.  
• A few times a year, a supervisor will stand next to you all 
day. Otherwise, we do not supervise. We do monitor “cus-
tomer service,” however, through sensors that measure 
your speed and accuracy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The paper posed the following question: how are courts able to 
interpret what very much looks like a “typical” relationship be-
tween an employer and employee as a relationship between two 
independent firms? The answer is that the employment contract 
itself is contradictory. The law’s attempt to render master-servant 
authority as a contract collapses the distinctions between contrac-
tual formation and performance, and, as a result, between the activ-
ities of bargaining and producing, and between the “ends” and 
“means” of the work. It enables courts to negate the importance of, 
or even reverse the meaning of, many of the factors probative of an 
employment relationship under the legal tests for employment sta-
tus. It enables courts to redefine features of industrial employment, 
like the opportunity for a promotion or permission to have a 
coworker cover a shift for you, into evidence of entrepreneurial 
opportunity. It also destabilizes the distinction between firms and 
markets.  
In the past, many social actors participated in institutionalizing 
employment as a somewhat intelligible relationship. They devel-
oped patterns of activity, media, norms, and organizations to repre-
sent employment in the industrial age. The institutional markers of 
industrial employment bore no necessary relation to the “means” 
or “ends” of the work, however. They were settlements. For a time, 
they submerged, but did not ultimately resolve, the contradiction 
                                                     
196 FedEx had argued that drivers had entrepreneurial opportunity because they 
could save money by locating cheap mechanics.  
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between servitude and equality embedded within the employment 
contract. 
Today, the contradictory nature of capitalist work is reemerg-
ing. Several changes appear to be causing the institutional disrup-
tion: a movement among firms to shift risks to workers, a reorien-
tation of the economy around financial markets putting ever more 
pressure on profits, the growth of the service sector, and technolog-
ical revolutions in logistics and communications. Institutional dis-
ruption forces judges to confront the contradictory complex of ser-
vitude and equality that defines employment. It prompts efforts to 
reconcile the tension between servitude and equality by construct-
ing new institutional features to mark an employment relationship.  
FedEx reorganized many of the conventional, institutional 
markers of industrial employment in the drivers’ work. These were 
markers that had purported to separate contractual formation from 
performance in employment. In an industrial manufacturing firm, 
for example, human resources personnel might hire the worker and 
explain salary and benefits. Later, distinct personnel in a manufac-
turing division will probably supervise the worker on the factory 
floor. These organizational markers separated the productive pro-
cess from the sorting of workers in the labor market and the con-
tracting process. Courts differed on how to make sense of the Fed-
Ex disorganization and thus how to understand the drivers’ work 
relationship with FedEx. In disorganizing these markers, FedEx 
enabled the contradiction within employment between master-
servant authority and contract to resurface. As courts contend with 
the doctrinal manifestations of this contradiction, they work to re-
institutionalize employment as an intelligible relationship. The IC 
decisions worked to re-institutionalize what looks much like what 
scholars have referred to as standard employment—a direct, full-
time, long-term relationship between a worker and a large firm—as 
one of independent entrepreneurialism. By drawing upon the am-
biguities embedded within the legal definition of employment, they 
transform employment into independent contracting, a firm into a 
market, and a bureaucracy into a nexus of contracts.  
This paper elaborated on one aspect of the institutional work 
that the IC decisions perform to reconstruct employment as a 
meaningful relationship: the decisions construct the written agree-
ment the drivers sign with FedEx as a marker of independent con-
tracting. First, they deposited the written agreement as a temporal 
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barrier between bargaining and producing. FedEx shifts the tem-
poral site of the contract signing from its location in an industrial 
employment arrangement to transform features of the relationship 
that would ordinarily be evidence of employer control over the 
“means” of the work into control over the “ends. Secondly, the IC 
decisions draw on the ambiguity in employment between the artic-
ulation of contractual duties and how they are performed to con-
struct the drivers’ written agreement as an institutional marker of 
independent contracting. The IC courts maintain that the document 
stated only the contractual ends of the drivers’ work, not its 
means.197 They suggest that such a lengthy contract must exhaust 
FedEx’s authority over drivers. It signals that FedEx has not re-
served the open-ended discretion in production that defines em-
ployment, that FedEx will not continue to bargain over the terms of 
work during production. The ostensibly detailed, upfront elabora-
tion of the work appears to establish and protects a sphere of inde-
pendent production.  
The contract has a double structure as an institutional marker. 
On the one hand, it is an “extra-legal data” point. Judges are gener-
ally most comfortable with understanding their role as classificato-
ry rather than constitutive. They would like employment to be a 
social relationship that is already “out there,” which they then fit 
within a legal category, not a relationship they create by legal fi-
at.198 Thus, the contract has an extra-legal existence that judges 
recognize. For instance, parties to not need to intend to create legal 
relations to create an enforceable contract—they must intend to be 
in a deal, however.199 The contract also has a legal existence—it is 
a template and regulatory structure for private exchanges.200 Writ-
ten documents purporting to be “contracts” do not necessarily meet 
                                                     
197  
198 Zatz, Working at the Boundaries, supra note _, at 940. 
199 See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. Ct. App. 1954). 
200 Roland Barthes’ semiotics is helpful here. Barthes theorized the “sign” as a 
“symbol” plus the “signified” thing. The written contract in these decisions works a like 
Barthes’ double exposure or revolving door explanation of a “myth.” In the myth, the 
signifier is a sign with a new signified. Here, the sign is the contract as legal template, 
and by interposing the contract as an institutional marker, the arbitrariness of the associa-
tion between the sign-as-signifier (contract as legal template) and new signified (non-
employment) is submerged in the association between the signified and signifier in the 
sign. ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES (1972).  
 
8/12/2015] From Hierarchies to Markets 67 
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
the requirements of a binding legal contract. In the many disputes 
over employment status, however, by assuming the trappings of a 
legal template, the written agreement gains doctrinal and norma-
tive valence as a marker of non-employment.  
 If the legal tests are ambiguous, and if the very definition of 
employment is contradictory, what was the basis for the author’s 
critique of the IC decisions? The paper argued that the decisions 
and their reasoning are wrong for reasons of doctrine, policy, and 
the legitimacy of the business form.  
 First, many of the elements in the governing tests that the 
courts either negate or even transform into evidence of independ-
ent contracting bear on what should be the ultimate doctrinal ques-
tion: is the disputed relationship more like a contract or more like a 
master-servant relationship?  
 Secondly, this difference is relevant to the premise of most 
statutory work laws, including those at issue in the IC decisions—
the NLRA and wage and hour law. The premise of most statutory 
employment protections is that a systematic disparity in bargaining 
power between workers and employers warrants statutory interven-
tion. To say that an employer has a “right” to control the work, 
from the perspective of contract doctrine, is simply an observation 
that the employer will tend to get its way in the continuing bargain-
ing over the work, as the employer directs the work and the em-
ployee decides whether to quit or to follow the employer’s direc-
tion. It means the employer has enough power to determine un-
specified, but significant, terms of the bargain as the work relation-
ship proceeds. Thus, the right to assign daily work is evidence of 
employment, because it indicates that one party has enough power 
to determine the quantity of labor the worker must provide for a 
given price. Several factors in the legal tests for employment status 
are relevant to the doctrinal and policy questions, including skill 
and the right to discipline the worker. They reflect whether one 
party continues to “bargain” over the terms of the work, and get its 
way, due to superior economic power. FHD and Judge Miller ex-
ploited the ambiguities in the employment contract to redefine con-
trol over production as equality in contracting.  
 For the same reasons, the paper is critical of the IC decision’s 
construction of the written agreement the drivers sign as a marker 
of non-employment. As an institutional marker, the written agree-
ment purports to deconstruct the coincidence of domination in pro-
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duction and independence in contracting that defines employment. 
This is, of course, what written contracts purport to do—separate 
the process of contractual formation from performance. Not every 
piece of paper with “agreement” on the front achieves this purpose, 
however. The drivers’ agreement does not delimit separate mo-
ments of contracting and production and protect the latter from the 
former. Rather than describe fixed obligations between FedEx and 
each driver, the agreement deposits the drivers into a tightly inte-
grated process of production controlled by FedEx. By its terms, the 
agreement gives FedEx a right to determine the essential terms of 
the bargain during the course of the work. The IC decisions allow 
FedEx to use the written agreement to write around not only the 
legal test for employment status, but also around the contractual 
requirements of consideration and definiteness. 
Finally, the paper suggested that the decisions rationalize a 
corporation whose boundaries bear no relation to the efficient pro-
duction of goods and services, but instead seem calculated to evade 
statutory work protections. 
Two modest changes in judges’ approach to employment status 
disputes would improve decision-making and restrict the tendency 
of judges hostile to statutory work protections.201 The first is al-
ready at hand: 
(1) Use contract law. In determining whether a relationship is 
one of employment or independent contracting, the ultimate ques-
tion courts are trying to get at is whether the relationship is more 
like an employment relationship or a contract. What distinguishes 
employment from other contracts involving acute power disparities 
is not the lopsidedness of specified terms. Employment entails a 
particular term giving one party open-ended authority. Courts 
could use principles from contract law involving consideration, 
definiteness, negotiation and closure, and good faith, to better get 
                                                     
 201 The bifurcated analysis explained in the 3rd Restatement of Employment Law 
would also much simplify and improve legal reasoning in employment status disputes. 
The Restatement recommends first looking at whether the alleged employer closely su-
pervises the physical details of work. This is sufficient, but not necessary, to establish 
employment status. When the alleged employer does not exercise such control, which 
could be the case in unskilled work where supervision is unnecessary or in the case of 
certain professional employees like doctors, the court would looks to whether the alleged 
employer’s control “effectively prevents the service provider from providing the services 
as an independent businessperson. RESTATEMENT 3D. OF EMPLOYMENT (2015). Under the 
Restatement, the FedEx drivers are clearly employees.  
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at the distinction: Do the ex ante terms of the agreement include a 
quantity term? Or is it more like a master-servant relationship, 
where one party agrees to provide an indefinite amount of labor for 
a definite payment? Are the essential terms of the bargain being 
worked out in production? Is it an “agreement to agree” by design? 
Does the agreement by its terms afford so much discretion to one 
party that it could deprive the other of the benefit of the bargain? 
As noted, several factors in the tests for employment status are rel-
evant to distinguishing contracts from master-servant relations.  
 (2) Use principles from major economic theories of the firm.202 
In order for any test for employment status focusing on a worker’s 
“entrepreneurial opportunity” to be useful, judges need some 
means of distinguishing entrepreneurial opportunity—or oppor-
tunity conferred by the market—from the opportunity an employee 
has within a firm. A firm theory approach might curb the tendency 
of some courts to find workers to be independent contractors so 
long as the workers retain a smidgen of discretion (which is al-
ways). For example, under a transaction cost approach considering 
the trade-off between flexibility and control, a court would focus 
on what calculability the alleged employer relinquished by turning 
to the market, not on what discretion the worker retained.203 This 
approach would also direct courts to look at the broader matrix of 
exchange and productive relations the parties inhabit: is there any 
other buyer on the market for the putative contractor’s services, for 
instance? If not, it is probably an employment relationship. Several 
factors in the legal tests for employment status already bear on 
whether the relationship more resembles firm production or market 
production.204  
                                                     
202 See Matthew T. Bodie, Participation as a Theory of Employment, 89 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 661 (2013) 
203 California in effect incorporates the concept of “residual” cost from transaction 
cost economics. This is the cost of lost calculability to the non-integrated from relinquish-
ing some control over production. California’s agency test looks at whether the alleged 
employer retained “all necessary control” for its purposes. S.G. Borello & Sons v. Dep’t 
of Indus. 
Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 405 (Cal. 1989). This shifts the focus of the means-ends stand-
ard away from what discretion a worker retains and away from the intensity of work 
monitoring. It centers the inquiry on whether the alleged employer supervises enough to 
meet its goals. Under this test, workers engaged in simple manual tasks are generally 
employees despite low levels of supervision.  
204 Statutory reforms that include less open-ended definitions of employment and re-
quire courts to consider statutory purpose would also help. Judge Miller found that some 
(continued next page) 
70    
DRAFT—DO NOT CITE 
Both of these solutions are limited. The first is dependent on 
the clarity of contract law. The second depends on our ability to 
distinguish firms from markets. It is not likely to work well when 
dealing with disputes over work arrangements less clear than the 
FedEx relationship. Much innovative research on contemporary 
arrangements for production rejects the firm-market binary. Firm 
theory cannot be of much help then if employment law continues 
to insist on an employment-independent contractor binary.  
The provisional solutions also would not solve the problem of 
ensuring that workers without employers could access rights and 
benefits. Unlike the FedEx drivers, many workers do not have 
clear employers that are capable of complying with the law. These 
include day laborers, migrant farm workers, and some home health 
aids. We need new governance solutions for these workers.205  
The provisional solutions elide another issue. Even if enforced 
in full, the panoply of rights the law affords to workers are insuffi-
cient to curb a growing inequality, durable poverty, and other mac-
roeconomic harms, or to ensure the individual has the opportunity 
to flourish as befits a human being and citizen. A minimum wage, 
for instance, is not a living wage. 
Finally, the problem is not simply that some courts draw the 
line between employment and other relationships in the “wrong” 
place. The law’s attempt to render master-servant authority as a 
contract creates challenges for all legal decision-makers, not just 
those inclined to rule in the employer’s favor. The prescription to 
draw from this article is not that we need a better method to draw a 
dividing line. The institutions that generate the categories requiring 
this bordering are flawed, and we need bigger fixes. Two goals 
should be to improve worker bargaining power or the supply elas-
ticity of labor206 and to decommodify labor effort.207 Only a radical 
                                                                                                                       
FedEx drivers were employees under state statutes with narrow exclusions for independ-
ent contractors. See Kansas decision, 734 F.Supp.2d at 694-95. Some jurisdictions recog-
nize a category of “dependent contractors.” Two other reforms would not depend on 
judges’ aptitude in recognizing an employment relationship—increasing penalties and 
improving enforcement of existing laws. 
205 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities 
and States, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (2010); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liabil-
ity for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2010).  
206 The first might entail providing opportunities for individuals to withdraw their 
labor from the market when the price goes down, as do owners of other commodities. 
Several policies and proposals tend to increase the elasticity of the supply of labor effort: 
(continued next page) 
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transformation in work relations will ultimately stabilize the legal 
identity of contemporary work. The interpretative ambiguities that 
result from trying to encase master-servant relations in contract are 
a manifestation of a deeper conflict: our aspirations to be capitalist 
yet democratic, to commodify human will but eschew human ser-
vitude, to reconcile liberty of contract with liberty of person. 
 
                                                                                                                       
living wages; expanded opportunities for education, re-skilling, child rearing, and self-
sustenance; social drawing rights; and a minimum income. See SUPIOT REPORT. 
207 An example would be to abolish employment and require that labor services be 
sold through contracts. See also Sachs, supra note _, for other proposals that would help 
restrict the exchange of human effort as a commodity.  
